

**ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
(COMMERCIAL LIST)**

B E T W E E N:

COMPUTERSHARE TRUST COMPANY OF CANADA

Applicant

- and -

MADY STEELES 2011 LTD.

Respondent

**BOOK OF AUTHORITIES OF THE APPLICANT
(Returnable March 5, 2015)**

Date: March 3, 2015

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Court File No.: CV-15-10897-00CL

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- 4 *Swiss Bank Corp. (Canada) v. Odyssey Industries Inc.* (1995), 30 C.B.R. (3d) 49 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List])
- 5 *Textron Financial Canada Ltd. v. Chetwynd Motels Ltd.* (2010) 67 C.B.R. (5th) 97 (B.C.S.C.)
- 6 Frank Bennett, *Bennett on Receiverships*, 3d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 2011).

7 *Uvalde Investment Co. v. 754223 Ontario Ltd.*, [1997] O.J. No. 711(Ont. Gen. Div.)

8 *STN Labs Inc. v. Saffron Rouge Inc.* (2010) 68 C.B.R. (5th) 287 (Ont. S.C.J.)

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2011 ONSC 1007
Ontario Superior Court of Justice

Bank of Montreal v. Carnival National Leasing Ltd.

2011 CarswellOnt 896, 2011 ONSC 1007, [2011] O.J. No. 671, 198 A.C.W.S. (3d) 79, 74 C.B.R. (5th) 300

**Bank of Montreal (Applicant) and Carnival National Leasing Limited and
Carnival Automobiles Limited (Respondents)**

Newbould J.

Heard: February 11, 2011
Judgment: February 15, 2011
Docket: CV-10-9029-00CL

Counsel: John J. Chapman, Arthi Sambasivan for Applicants
Fred Tayar, Colby Linthwaite for Respondents
Rachelle F. Mancur for Royal Bank of Canada

Subject: Corporate and Commercial; Insolvency

Related Abridgment Classifications

For all relevant Canadian Abridgment Classifications refer to highest level of case via History.

Headnote

Debtors and creditors --- Receivers --- Appointment --- Application for appointment --- Grounds

Debtor was in business of leasing motor vehicles — Debtor was indebted to creditor bank; vehicles guaranteed indebtedness to \$1.5 million — Creditor held security over assets of debtor including general security agreement under which it had right to appoint receiver of debtor or to apply to court for appointment of receiver — Under terms of wholesale leasing facility, total advances for used vehicle financing were not to exceed 30 percent of approved lease portfolio credit line — Creditor's account manager was informed that used car lease portfolio was 60 percent of leases financed by creditor, well in excess of 30 percent condition of loan — Creditor delivered demands for payment — Creditor applied for appointment of receiver — Application granted — Debtor relied on decision in which judge was critical of actions of bank in overstating its case and making unsupportable allegations of fraud — In case at bar there was no basis to refuse order sought because of alleged misconduct on part of creditor or its counsel — If anything, shoe was on other foot as factum filed on behalf of debtor was replete with allegations of false assertions on behalf of creditor, none of which were established — Cited case was relied upon in which it was held that where security instrument permits appointment of private receiver, extraordinary nature of remedy sought is less essential to inquiry — It was preferable to have court appointed receiver rather than privately appointed one as debtor stated that if private appointment was made it would litigate its right to do so.

Table of Authorities

Cases considered by *Newbould J.*:

Anderson v. Hunking (2010), 2010 CarswellOnt 5191, 2010 ONSC 4008 (Ont. S.C.J.) — referred to

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Bank of Nova Scotia v. Freure Village on Clair Creek (1996), 1996 CarswellOnt 2328, 40 C.B.R. (3d) 274 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — followed

Kavcar Investments Ltd. v. Aetna Financial Services Ltd. (1989), 70 O.R. (2d) 225, 77 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1, 35 O.A.C. 305, 62 D.L.R. (4th) 277, 1989 CarswellOnt 191 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to

Royal Bank v. Boussoulas (2010), 2010 ONSC 4650, 2010 CarswellOnt 6332 (Ont. S.C.J.) — considered

Royal Bank v. Chongsim Investments Ltd. (1997), 1997 CarswellOnt 988, 28 O.T.C. 102, 32 O.R. (3d) 565, 46 C.B.R. (3d) 267 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — distinguished

Ryder Truck Rental Canada Ltd. v. 568907 Ontario Ltd. (1987), 1987 CarswellOnt 383, 16 C.P.C. (2d) 130 (Ont. H.C.) — considered

Swiss Bank Corp. (Canada) v. Odyssey Industries Inc. (1995), 30 C.B.R. (3d) 49, 1995 CarswellOnt 39 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — considered

Toronto Dominion Bank v. Pritchard (1997), 154 D.L.R. (4th) 141, 104 O.A.C. 373, 1997 CarswellOnt 4277 (Ont. Div. Ct.) — considered

1468121 Ontario Ltd. v. 663789 Ontario Ltd. (2008), 2008 CarswellOnt 7601 (Ont. S.C.J.) — not followed

Statutes considered:

Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3
s. 243 — referred to

s. 243(1) — considered

Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43
s. 101 — considered

APPLICATION by creditor for appointment of private receiver of debtor.

Newbould J.:

1 Bank of Montreal ("BMO") applies for the appointment of PriceWaterhouse Coopers Inc. as national receiver of the respondents Carnival National Leasing Limited ("Carnival") and Carnival Automobiles Limited ("Automobiles") under sections 243 (1) of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* and 101 of the *Courts of Justice Act*.

2 Carnival is in the business of leasing new and used passenger cars, trucks, vans and equipment vehicles. It has approximately 1300 vehicles in its fleet. Carnival is indebted to BMO for approximately \$17 million pursuant to demand loan facilities. Automobiles guaranteed the indebtedness of Carnival to BMO limited to \$1.5 million. David Hirsh is the president and sole director of Carnival and has guaranteed its indebtedness to BMO limited to \$700,000. BMO holds security over the assets of Carnival and Automobiles, including a general security agreement under which it has the right to appoint a receiver of the debtors or to apply to court for the appointment of a receiver. On November 30, 2010 BMO delivered demands for payment to Carnival, Automobiles and Mr. Hirsh.

3 The respondents contend that no receiver should be appointed. In my view BMO is entitled to appoint PWC as a receiver of the respondents and it is so ordered for the reasons that follow.

Events leading to demand for payment

4 The respondents quarrel with the actions of BMO leading to the demands for payment and assert that as a result a receiver should not be appointed.

5 BMO has been Carnival's banker for 21 years. Loans were made annually on terms contained in a term sheet. Each year BMO did an annual review of the account, after which a new term sheet for the following year was signed. The last term sheet was signed on January 29, 2010 and was for the 2010 calendar year. The last annual review, completed on October 27, 2010, recommended a renewal of the credits with various changes being proposed, including a risk rating upgrade from 45 to 40 and a reduction in the demand wholesale leasing facility from \$21.9 million to \$20 million. That review, however, was not sent to senior management for approval and no agreement was made extending the credit facilities to Carnival for the 2011 calendar year.

6 The 2010 term sheet provided for two major lines of credit. The larger facility was a demand wholesale leasing facility with a limit of \$21.9 million, under which Carnival submitted vehicle leases to BMO. If a lease was approved BMO advanced up to 100% of the cost of the vehicle and in return received security over the vehicle. The second facility was a general overdraft facility described as a demand operating loan with a limit of \$1.15 million. The term sheet provided that all lines of credit were made on a demand loan basis and that BMO reserved the right to cancel the lines of credit "at any time at its sole discretion".

7 Under the terms of the wholesale leasing facility, total advances for used vehicle financing were not to exceed 30% of the approved lease portfolio credit line. That apparently had been a term of the facility for many years. The annual review of October 27, 2010 stated that for the past year, the concentration of used leases was 27.8%. In the previous annual review in 2009, the figure for used lease concentration was 11.6%. Mr. Findlay of the BMO special accounts management unit (SAMU) said on cross-examination that while he could not say as a fact where those percentages came from, the routine for annual reviews was for the person preparing the annual review to obtain such figures from the support staff of the bank's automotive centre.

8 Shortly after the 2010 annual review had been completed, and before it was sent to higher levels of the bank for approval, Mr. Lavery, the account manager at BMO for Carnival, received information from someone at BMO, the identity of whom I do not believe is in the record, informing him that the used car lease portfolio was approximately 60% of the leases financed by BMO, well in excess of the 30% condition of the loan. That led Mr. Lavery to call Mr. Findlay of SAMU. On November 17, 2010 BMO engaged PWC to review the operations of Carnival. On November 26, 2010 BMO's solicitors delivered to Carnival a letter which stated, amongst other things, that BMO would not finance any future leases until PWC's review engagement was completed, that BMO would no longer allow any overdraft on Carnival's operating line and that the bank reserved its right to demand payment of any indebtedness at any time in the future.

9 On November 29, 2010 PWC provided its initial report to BMO. It contained a number of matters of concern to BMO, including itemizing a number of breaches of the lending agreements that Carnival had with BMO. On November 30, 2010 BMO's solicitors delivered to Carnival a letter itemizing a number of breaches of the loan agreements, one of which was that advances for used vehicle financing were in excess of 30% of the approved lease portfolio credit line. Demand for payment under the lines of credit totalling \$17,736,838.45 was made. Following the demand, PWC continued its engagement and discovered a number of irregularities in the Carnival business, some of which are contained in the affidavit of Mr. Findlay.

10 It turns out that the 30% limit for used vehicle leases had not been met for some time. Carnival provided to BMO's automotive centre copies of the individual leases and bills of sale which showed the model year of the car to be financed and this information was in the BMO automotive centre computer records. Reports on BMO's website as at December 31, 2008 demonstrated 45% of Carnival's BMO financed leases were for used vehicles. At December 31, 2009 it was 73% and as

at October 31, 2001 it was 60%. The evidence of Mr. Findlay on cross-examination was that while that information was on the computer system, it was not known by the account management responsible for the Carnival credits. He acknowledged that if the account management went to the computer system they would have seen that information but if they did not they would not have known of it. There is no evidence that Mr. Lavery or others in the account management of BMO responsible for the Carnival credit were aware before late October, 2010 of the true percentage of the used car lease portfolio.

11 Mr. Hirsh said on cross-examination that he assumed somebody in control at the bank knew the percentage of used vehicle leases. Although the loan terms he signed each year contained the 30% condition, he never suggested that the percentage should be changed to a higher figure. One can argue that Mr. Hirsh should have told his account manager at BMO that the condition he was agreeing to was not being met. Of course if he had done so he could well have faced a likely loss of credit needed to run his business. The loan terms included a requirement that Carnival provide an annual detailed analysis of the entire lease portfolio, including a breakdown of the lease concentrations. Had those been provided, it would appear that the percentage of used vehicle leases would have been reported by Carnival. While the record does not indicate whether such reports were provided, I think it can be assumed that if they had been, Mr. Hirsh would have provided that information in his affidavit.

12 Since November 26, 2010, BMO has not financed any further vehicles under the demand wholesale line of credit. Pending the application to appoint a receiver, BMO has continued to extend the \$1.15 million operating facility, in spite of its demand. Under the terms of the demand wholesale line of credit, Carnival is obliged after selling vehicles financed by BMO to pay down the wholesale leasing line within 30 days by transferring the money received from its operating line account to the wholesale leasing line. It has not always done so and PWC estimates the amount involved to be \$814,000. The operating facility is now in overdraft as a result of the demand for payment.

Issues

(a) Right to enforce payment

13 On a demand loan, a debtor must be allowed a reasonable time to raise the necessary funds to satisfy the demand. Reasonable time will generally be of a short duration, not more than a few days and not encompassing anything approaching 30 days. See *Kavcar Investments Ltd. v. Aetna Financial Services Ltd.* (1989), 70 O.R. (2d) 225 (Ont. C.A.) per McKinley J.A. See also *Toronto Dominion Bank v. Pritchard*, [1997] O.J. No. 4622 (Ont. Div. Ct.) per Farley J.:

5. It is clear therefore that the reasonable time to repay after demand is a very finite time measured in days, not weeks, and it is not "open ended" beyond this by the difficulties that a borrower may have in seeking replacement financing, be it bridge or permanent.

14 Under the loan agreements, the credits were on demand and as well BMO had the right to cancel the credits at any time at its sole discretion. It is now over 70 days since demand for payment was made.

15 I do not see the issue of BMO management not being aware of the percentage of used car leases as affecting BMO's rights under its loan agreements, even assuming it was all BMO's fault, which I am not at all sure is the case. There is no evidence that BMO in any way intentionally waived its 30% loan condition, nor is it the case that it was only a breach of the 30% condition that led to the demand for payment being delivered to Carnival. There were a number of other concerns that

BMO had. In any event, there was no requirement before demand or termination of the credits that BMO had to have justification to demand payment. To the contrary, the agreement provided that BMO had the right to terminate the credits at any time at its sole discretion.

16 In argument, Mr. Tayar said that Carnival needs just a little more time to obtain financing to pay out the BMO loans. From a legal point of view Carnival has been provided more time than is required. From a practical point of view, it is very unlikely that Carnival will be able in any reasonably foreseeable period of time to pay out BMO.

17 The car leasing business for businesses such as Carnival has been very difficult for a number of years, as acknowledged by Mr. Hirsh. Competitors such as Ford, GM and Chrysler began offering very low interest rates for new vehicles that Carnival could not provide. The economy led to more customers missing payments. There were lower sales generally. Carnival's leased assets fell from \$49 million in 2006 to \$35 million in 2009. Carnival had a profit of \$1.2 million in 2006 but in the years 2007 through 2009 had a cumulative net loss of \$244,000. While its business was shrinking, Carnival's accounts receivable grew significantly, from \$1.5 million in 2006 to \$2.8 million in 2009, indicating, as Mr. Hirsh acknowledged on cross-examination, that customers owed more than in the past for lease payments because of difficult economic times.

18 Carnival also borrowed from RBC to finance its lease portfolio. Some leases were financed with BMO and some with RBC. In the mid-2000s, the size of Carnival's loan facility with BMO and RBC was about even. In 2008 RBC stopped lending to Carnival on new leases and since then Carnival has been paying down its RBC loans. Today Carnival owes RBC approximately \$5.6 million. Thus Carnival owes the two banks approximately \$22.6 million.

19 In an affidavit sworn February 8, 2011, Mr. Hirsh disclosed that he has had discussions with TD Bank and has an indication of a loan of approximately \$11.5 million. A deal sheet has yet to be provided to TD's credit department for approval, but is expected to be considered by the end of February. If approved, it is contemplated that funds could be advanced sometime in April. Mr. Hirsh states that the TD guidelines allow TD to advance (i) on new vehicles \$6.5 million on leases currently financed by BMO and \$1.9 million on leases currently financed by RBC and (ii) on used vehicles, \$2 million on leases currently financed by BMO and \$392,000 on leases currently financed by RBC. A further \$2 million would be available on non-bank financed leases. Thus if a TD loan were granted, at most the amount that would be available to pay down BMO would be \$10.5 million and it might be less if, as is likely, there are not \$6.5 million worth of new car leases currently being financed by BMO.

20 Mr. Hirsh further states in his affidavit that he believes he will be able to pay off the balance of BMO loans through a combination of TD financing new Carnival leases and the payout of existing leases and/or sales of Carnival vehicles. No time estimate is given for this and one can only conclude that it would not be soon.

21 In these circumstances, assuming that it is permissible to consider the chances of refinancing in considering what a reasonable time would be to permit enforcement of security after a demand for payment, I do not consider the chances of refinancing in this case to prevent BMO from acting on its security.

22 BMO had the right under its loan agreements to stop financing new vehicle leases and to demand payment of the outstanding loans. No new term sheet was signed for 2011. Since the demand for payment, it has provided far more time than

required in order to enforce its security. In my view, BMO is entitled to payment of the outstanding loans and to enforce its security including, if it wished to do so, to privately appoint a receiver of the assets of Carnival and Automobile or serve notices to the large number of lessees of the assignment of the leases and require payment directly to BMO.

(b) Court appointed receiver

23 Under section 243 of the *BLA* and section 101 of the *Courts of Justice Act*, a court may appoint a receiver if it is “just and convenient” to do so.

24 In *Bank of Nova Scotia v. Freure Village on Clair Creek* (1996), 40 C.B.R. (3d) 274 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]), Blair J. (as he then was) dealt with a similar situation in which the bank held security that permitted the appointment of a private receiver or an application to court to have a court appointed receiver. He summarized the legal principles involved as follows:

10 The Court has the power to appoint a receiver or receiver and manager where it is “just or convenient” to do so: the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. 43, s. 101. In deciding whether or not to do so, it must have regard to all of the circumstances but in particular the nature of the property and the rights and interests of all parties in relation thereto. The fact that the moving party has a right under its security to appoint a receiver is an important factor to be considered but so, in such circumstances, is the question of whether or not an appointment by the Court is necessary to enable the receiver-manager to carry out its work and duties more efficiently; see generally *Third Generation Realty Ltd. v. Twigg* (1991) 6 C.P.C. (3d) 366 at pages 372-374; *Confederation Trust Co. v. Dentbram Developments Ltd.* (1992), 9 C.P.C. (3d) 399; *Royal Trust Corp. of Canada v. D.Q. Plaza Holdings Ltd.* (1984), 54 C.B.R. (N.S.) 18 at page 21. It is not essential that the moving party, a secured creditor, establish that it will suffer irreparable harm if a receiver-manager is not appointed: *Swiss Bank Corp. (Canada) v. Odyssey Industries Inc.* (1995), 30 C.B.R. (3d) 49.

25 It is argued on behalf of Carnival that the appointment of a receiver is an extraordinary remedy to be granted sparingly and that as it amounts to execution before judgment, there must be strong evidence that the plaintiff’s right to judgment must be exercised sparingly. The cases that support this proposition, however, are not applicable as they do not deal with a secured creditor with the right to enforce its security.

26 *Ryder Truck Rental Canada Ltd. v. 568907 Ontario Ltd.* (1987), 16 C.P.C. (2d) 130 (Ont. H.C.) is relied on by Carnival as supporting its position. That case however dealt with a disputed claim to payments said to be owing and a claim for damages. The plaintiff had no security that permitted the appointment of a receiver and requested a court appointed receiver until trial. Salhany L.J.S.C. likened the situation to a plaintiff seeking execution before judgment and considered that the test to support the appointment of a receiver was no less stringent than the test to support a Mareva injunction. With respect, that is not the law of Ontario so far as enforcing security is concerned. The same situation pertained in *Anderson v. Hunking*, 2010 ONSC 4008 (Ont. S.C.J.) cited by Mr. Tayar. I have serious doubts whether *1468121 Ontario Ltd. v. 663789 Ontario Ltd.*, 2008 CarswellOnt 7601 (Ont. S.C.J.) cited by Mr. Tayar was correctly decided and would not follow it.

27 In *Bank of Nova Scotia v. Freure Village on Clair Creek*, Blair J. dealt with an argument similar to the one advanced by Carnival and stated that the extraordinary nature of the remedy sought was less essential where the security provided for a private or court appointed receiver and the issue was essentially whether it was preferable to have a court appointed receiver rather than a private appointment. He stated:

11. The Defendants and the opposing creditor argue that the Bank can perfectly effectively exercise its private remedies and that the Court should not intervene by giving the extraordinary remedy of appointing a receiver when it has not yet done so and there is no evidence its interest will not be well protected if it did. They also argue that a Court appointed receiver will be more costly than a privately appointed one, eroding their interests in the property.

12. While I accept the general notion that the appointment of a receiver is an extraordinary remedy, it seems to me that where the security instrument permits the appointment of a private receiver - and even contemplates, as this one does, the secured creditor seeking a court appointed receiver - and where the circumstances of default justify the appointment of a private receiver, the "extraordinary" nature of the remedy sought is less essential to the inquiry. Rather, the "just or convenient" question becomes one of the Court determining, in the exercise of its discretion, whether it is more in the interests of all concerned to have the receiver appointed by the Court or not. This, of course, involves an examination of all the circumstances which I have outlined earlier in this endorsement, including the potential costs, the relationship between the debtor and the creditors, the likelihood of maximizing the return on and preserving the subject property and the best way of facilitating the work and duties of the receiver-manager

28 In *Swiss Bank Corp. (Canada) v. Odyssey Industries Inc.* (1995), 30 C.B.R. (3d) 49 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]), in which the bank held security that permitted the appointment of a private or court ordered receiver, Ground J. made similar observations:

28. The first submission of counsel for Odyssey and Weston is that there is no risk of irreparable harm to Swiss Bank if a receiver is not appointed as certificates of pending litigation have been filed against the real estate properties involved, and there is an existing order restraining the disposition of other assets. I know of no authority for the proposition that a creditor must establish irreparable harm if the appointment of a receiver is not granted by the court. In fact, the authorities seem to support the proposition that irreparable harm need not be demonstrated. (see *Bank of Montreal v. Appcon* (1981), 33 O.R. (2d) 97).

29 See also *Bank of Nova Scotia v. D.G. Jewelry Inc.* (2002), 38 C.B.R. (4th) 7 (Ont. S.C.J.) in which Ground J. rejected the notion that it is necessary where there is security that permits the appointment of a private or court ordered receiver to establish that the property is threatened with danger, and said that the test was whether a court ordered receiver could more effectively carry out its duties than it could if privately appointed. He stated:

I do not think that, in order to appoint an Interim Receiver pursuant to Section 47 of the BIA, I must be satisfied that there is an actual and immediate danger of a dissipation of assets. The decision of Nova Scotia Registrar Smith in *Royal Bank v. Zutphen Brothers*, [1993] N.S.J. No. 640, is not, in my view, the law of Ontario.

...

On the main issue of the test to be applied by the court in determining whether to appoint a Receiver, I do not think the Ontario courts have followed the Saskatchewan authorities cited by Mr. Tayar which require a finding that the legal remedies available to the party seeking the appointment are defective or that the appointment is necessary to preserve the property from some danger which threatens it, neither of which could be established in the case before this court. The test, which I think this court should apply, is whether the appointment of a court - appointed Receiver will enable that Receiver to more effectively and efficiently carry out its duties and obligations than it could do if privately appointed.

30 This is not a case like *Royal Bank v. Chongsim Investments Ltd.* (1997), 32 O.R. (3d) 565 (Ont. Gen. Div.) in which Epstein J. (as she then was) dismissed a motion to appoint a receiver. While the loan was a demand loan and the bank's security permitted the appointment of a receiver, the parties had agreed that the loan would not be demanded absent default,

and Epstein J. held that the bank, acting in bad faith, had set out to do whatever was necessary to create a default. Thus she held it was not equitable to grant the relief sought. That case is not applicable to the facts of this case.

31 Carnival relies on a decision in *Royal Bank v. Boussoulas*, [2010] O.J. No. 3611 (Ont. S.C.J.), in which Stinson J. was highly critical of the actions of the bank and its counsel in overstating its case and making unsupportable allegations of fraud in its motion affidavit material and facts filed before him and previously before Cumming J. He thus declined to continue a Mareva injunction earlier ordered by Cumming J. or appoint an interim receiver over the defendant's assets. There is no question but that a court can decline to order equitable relief in the face of misconduct on the part of a party seeking equitable relief.

32 In my view, there is no basis to refuse the order sought because of alleged misconduct on the part of BMO or its counsel. To the contrary, if anything, the shoe is on the other foot. The factum filed on behalf of Carnival is replete with allegations of false assertions on behalf of BMO, none of which have been established.

33 Carnival says the first affidavit of Mr. Findlay was false when it said that the bank first discovered the high concentration of used cars in late October, 2010, because it says the concentration was on the bank's website. This ignores the fact that the account management personnel responsible for the Carnival account did not know of the high concentration of used car leases in excess of the 30% limit, as testified to by Mr. Findlay and evident from the loan reviews for the past two years prepared by account management which stated that the used car concentration was 27.8 and 11.6 %. Although the BMO internal auditors had conducted quarterly audits, the unchallenged evidence of Mr. Findlay is that the purpose of each audit was to review whether each individual lease has been properly papered and handled. The audit did not look at the Carnival portfolio as a whole or to see what percentage of leases were for new or used vehicles.

34 It is argued that BMO has tried to mislead the Court by suggesting that payments received by Carnival after a leased vehicle was sold were to be held in trust for BMO. There is nothing in this allegation. Mr. Findlay referred in his affidavit to the term "sold out of trust", or SOT, a term apparently widely used in the automobile industry, to refer to the situation in which a borrower such as Carnival fails to remit to its lender the proceeds of sale of a financed vehicle. Mr. Findlay did not say that there was any type of legal trust, nor did he imply it. He identified what he said were SOTs, as did PWC in its report, and while he said on cross-examination that he understood that all proceeds from sales of vehicles were paid into Carnival's account at BMO, Carnival had not paid down its loans with these proceeds as it was required to do under the loan terms, but rather had kept the money in its operating account available for its operating purposes. The fact that some of Mr. Findlay's calculations of amounts involved differ from the calculations of PWC after it was sent in to investigate the situation hardly makes the case that BMO set out to mislead the Court by a fabrication and by use of falsified numbers, as was alleged in Mr. Tayar's factum.

35 In his first affidavit Mr. Findlay referred to a concern of BMO as set out in the initial report that Mr. Hirsh was using the Carnival operating line to pay personal mortgages on his home. On cross-examination he said he understood that the money from the mortgages was put into the Carnival account as an injection of capital and he agreed that the payment of interest on the mortgages from Carnival's account was not an improper use of its resources. This is somewhat different from the statement of concern in his affidavit, but I do not see it as terribly important and as Mr. Findlay was in special account management and not managing the account, it is quite possible that the difference was due to learning more and changing his mind. I do not conclude that he set out to mislead the Court.

36 In my view, it would be preferable to have a court appointed receiver rather than a privately appointed one. Mr. Tayar

said that if a private appointment were made, Carnival would litigate its right to do so. This would not at all be helpful when it is recognized that there are some 1300 vehicles under lease and any dispute as to whom lease payments were to be paid could quickly dry up or lessen the payments made. There are already a number of leases in default, and people might opportunistically decide not to pay if there were a dispute as to who was in control. The prospect of more litigation was a consideration that led Blair J. to ordering the appointment of a receiver in *Bank of Nova Scotia v. Freure Village on Clair Creek*.

37 While there may be increased costs over a private receivership, it would appear that this may well be at the expense of BMO and RBC, the other secured creditor. RBC supports the appointment of a receiver by the Court. Carnival has accounts receivable of some \$4.4 million. As at November 25, approximately \$3 million was more than 120 days old. The book value of the leases of \$30 million is therefore questionable, and the repayment of \$22.6 owing to BMO and RBC is not assured. Further, a court appointed receiver would have borrowing powers, which might be required as Cardinal has not so far been able to obtain new operating credit lines.

38 In the circumstances the order sought by BMO is granted in the form contained in tab 3 of the application record.

Application granted.

2

1996 CarswellOnt 2328
Ontario Court of Justice (General Division — Commercial List)

Bank of Nova Scotia v. Freure Village on Clair Creek

1996 CarswellOnt 2328, [1996] O.J. No. 5088, 40 C.B.R. (3d) 274

Bank of Nova Scotia v. Freure Village on Clair Creek et al

Blair J.

Judgment: May 31, 1996
Docket: none given

Counsel: *John J. Chapman* and *John R. Varley*, for Bank of Nova Scotia.
J. Gregory Murdoch, for Freure Group (all defendants).
John Lancaster, for Boehmers, a Division of St. Lawrence Cement.
Robb English, for Toronto-Dominion Bank.
William T. Houston, for Canada Trust

Subject: Corporate and Commercial; Insolvency

Related Abridgment Classifications

For all relevant Canadian Abridgment Classifications refer to highest level of case via History.

Headnote

Receivers --- Appointment — Application for appointment — General

Receivers — Appointment — Application for appointment — Under s. 101 of Courts of Justice Act court to consider whether “just and convenient” to appoint receiver or receiver-manager — Fact that creditor has right under security to appoint receiver being important factor to be considered — Court appointment possibly allowing privately appointed receiver to carry out duties more efficiently — Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43.

The debtor companies owed a bank in excess of \$13,200,000 on four mortgages relating to five properties. Three of the mortgages had matured but had not been repaid. The fourth had not yet matured, but was in default. The bank applied for summary judgment on the covenants on the mortgages and for the appointment of a receiver-manager for the five properties. The debtor companies argued that the bank had agreed to forbear for six months to a year and, therefore, the moneys were not due and owing at the commencement of the proceedings. They also argued that the bank could effectively exercise its private remedies and that the court should not intervene to grant the extraordinary remedy of appointing a receiver when the bank had not yet done so.

Held:

The motions were granted.

The debtor companies’ arguments with respect to the motion for summary judgment were without merit. The principal of the companies admitted that he was well aware that the bank had not waived its rights under its security or to enforce its security. There was no triable issue.

Under s. 101 of the *Courts of Justice Act* (Ont.), the court has the power to appoint a receiver or receiver-manager when it is “just and convenient” to do so. The fact that a creditor has a right under its security to appoint a receiver is an important factor to be considered. Also to be considered is whether a court appointment is necessary to enable the privately appointed receiver-manager to carry out its duties more efficiently. A creditor need not prove that it will suffer irreparable harm if no appointment is made. Where the creditor seeking the appointment has the right under its security to appoint a receiver-manager itself, the remedy is less “extraordinary” in nature. Determining whether the appointment is “just and convenient” becomes a question of whether it is more in the interests of the parties to have the court appoint the receiver. In the case at bar, it was appropriate to appoint a receiver-manager. The debtor companies had been attempting to refinance for a year and a half without success. Further, the parties could not agree on the best approach for marketing the properties. A court-appointed receiver with a mandate to develop a marketing plan could resolve that impasse, whereas a privately appointed receiver could not likely do so without further litigation. Given, however, that there seemed to be a possibility of a refinancing agreement in the near future, the appointment was postponed for three weeks.

Table of Authorities

Cases considered:

Confederation Trust Co. v. Dentbram Developments Ltd. (1992), 9 C.P.C. (3d) 399 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — *referred to*

Irving Ungerman Ltd. v. Galanis (1991), 4 O.R. (3d) 545, 20 R.P.R. (2d) 49 (note), 83 D.L.R. (4th) 734, 1 C.P.C. (3d) 248, (sub nom. *Ungerman (Irving) Ltd. v. Galanis*) 50 O.A.C. 176 (C.A.) — *referred to*

Pizza Pizza Ltd. v. Gillespie (1990), 75 O.R. (2d) 225, 45 C.P.C. (2d) 168, 33 C.P.R. (3d) 515 (Gen. Div.) — *referred to*

Royal Trust Corp. of Canada v. DQ Plaza Holdings Ltd. (1984), 54 C.B.R. (N.S.) 18, 36 Sask. R. 84 (Q.B.) — *referred to*

Swiss Bank Corp. (Canada) v. Odyssey Industries Inc. (1995), 30 C.B.R. (3d) 49 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — *referred to*

Third Generation Realty Ltd. v. Twigg Holdings Ltd. (1991), 6 C.P.C. (3d) 366 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — *referred to*

Statutes considered:

Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43

s. 101*referred to*

Rules considered:

Ontario, Rules of Civil Procedure

r. 20.01*referred to*

r. 20.04*referred to*

MOTION for summary judgment on covenant on mortgages; MOTION for appointment of receiver-manager.

Blair J.:

1 There are two companion motions here, namely:

(i) the within motion by the Bank for summary judgment on the covenants on mortgages granted by “Freure Management” and “Freure Village” to the Bank, which mortgages have been guaranteed by Freure Investments; and

(ii) the motion for appointment by the Court of a receiver-manager over five different properties which are the subject matter of the mortgages (four of which properties are apartment/townhouse complexes totalling 286 units and one of which is an as yet undeveloped property).

2 This endorsement pertains to both motions.

The Motion for Summary Judgment

3 Three of the mortgages have matured and have not been repaid. The fourth has not yet matured but, along with the first three, is in default as a result of the failure to pay tax arrears. The total tax arrears outstanding are in excess of \$850,000. The Bank is owed in excess of \$13,200,000. There is no question that the mortgages are in default. Nor is it contested that the monies are presently due and owing. The Defendants argue, however, that the Bank had agreed to forbear or to stand-still for six months to a year in May, 1995 and therefore submit the monies were not due and owing at the time demand was made and proceedings commenced.

4 There is simply no merit to this defence on the evidence and there is no issue with respect to it which survives the “good hard look at the evidence” which the authorities require the Court to take and which requires a trial for its disposition: see Rule 20.01 and Rule 20.04, *Pizza Pizza Ltd. v. Gillespie* (1990), 75 O.R. (2d) 225 (Gen. Div.); *Irving Ungerman Ltd. v. Galanis* (1993) 4 O.R. (3d) 545 (C.A.).

5 On his cross-examination, Mr. Freure admitted:

(i) that he knew the Bank had not entered into any agreement whereby it had waived its rights under its security or to enforce its security; and

(ii) that he realized the Bank was entitled to make demand, that the individual debtors in the Freure Group owed the money, that they did not have the money to pay and the \$13,200,000 indebtedness was “due and owing” (see cross-examination questions 46-54, 88-96, 233-243).

6 As to the guarantees of Freure Investments, an argument was put forward that the Bank changed its position with regard to the accumulation of tax arrears without notice to the guarantor, and accordingly that a triable issue exists in that regard.

7 No such triable issue exists. The guarantee provisions of the mortgage itself permit the Bank to negotiate changes in the security with the principal debtor. Moreover, the principal of the principal debtor and the principal of the guarantor - Mr. Freure - are the same. Finally, the evidence which is relied upon for the change in the Bank's position - an internal Bank memo from the local branch to the credit committee of the Bank in Toronto - is not proof of any such agreement with the debtor or change; it is merely a recitation of various position proposals and a recommendation to the credit committee, which was not followed.

8 Accordingly, summary judgment is granted as sought in accordance with the draft judgment filed today and on which I have placed my fiat. The cost portion of the judgment will bear interest at the *Courts of Justice Act* rate.

Receiver/Manager

9 The more difficult issue for determination is whether or not the Court should appoint a receiver/manager.

10 It is conceded, in effect, that if the loans are in default and not saved from immediate payment by the alleged forbearance agreement - which they are, and are not, respectively - the Bank is entitled to move under its security and appoint a receiver-manager privately. Indeed this is the route which the Defendants - supported by the subsequent creditor on one of the properties (Boehmers, on the Glencairn property) - urge must be taken. The other major creditors, TD Bank and Canada Trust, who are owed approximately \$20,000,000 between them, take no position on the motion.

11 The Court has the power to appoint a receiver or receiver and manager where it is "just or convenient" to do so: the *Courts of Justice Act*, R.S.O. 1990, c. 43, s. 101. In deciding whether or not to do so, it must have regard to all of the circumstances but in particular the nature of the property and the rights and interests of all parties in relation thereto. The fact that the moving party has a right under its security to appoint a receiver is an important factor to be considered but so, in such circumstances, is the question of whether or not an appointment by the Court is necessary to enable the receiver-manager to carry out its work and duties more efficiently; see generally *Third Generation Realty Ltd. v. Twigg* (1991) 6 C.P.C. (3d) 366 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at pages 372-374; *Confederation Trust Co. v. Dentbram Developments Ltd.* (1992), 9 C.P.C. (3d) 399 (Ont. Gen. Div.); *Royal Trust Corp. of Canada v. D.Q. Plaza Holdings Ltd.* (1984), 54 C.B.R. (N.S.) 18 (Sask. Q.B.) at page 21. It is not essential that the moving party, a secured creditor, establish that it will suffer irreparable harm if a receiver-manager is not appointed: *Swiss Bank Corp. (Canada) v. Odyssey Industries Inc.* (1995), 30 C.B.R. (3d) 49 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]).

12 The Defendants and the opposing creditor argue that the Bank can perfectly effectively exercise its private remedies and that the Court should not intervene by giving the extraordinary remedy of appointing a receiver when it has not yet done so and there is no evidence its interest will not be well protected if it did. They also argue that a Court appointed receiver will be more costly than a privately appointed one, eroding their interests in the property.

13 While I accept the general notion that the appointment of a receiver is an extraordinary remedy, it seems to me that where the security instrument permits the appointment of a private receiver - and even contemplates, as this one does, the secured creditor seeking a court appointed receiver - and where the circumstances of default justify the appointment of a private receiver, the "extraordinary" nature of the remedy sought is less essential to the inquiry. Rather, the "just or convenient" question becomes one of the Court determining, in the exercise of its discretion, whether it is more in the interests of all concerned to have the receiver appointed by the Court or not. This, of course, involves an examination of all the circumstances which I have outlined earlier in this endorsement, including the potential costs, the relationship between the debtor and the creditors, the likelihood of maximizing the return on and preserving the subject property and the best way of facilitating the work and duties of the receiver-manager.

14 Here I am satisfied on balance it is just and convenient for the order sought to be made. The Defendants have been attempting to refinance the properties for 1 1/2 years without success, although a letter from Mutual Trust dated yesterday suggests (again) the possibility of a refinancing in the near future. The Bank and the debtors are deadlocked and I infer from the history and evidence that the Bank's attempts to enforce its security privately will only lead to more litigation. Indeed, the debtor's solicitors themselves refer to the prospect of "costly, protracted and unproductive" litigation in a letter dated March 21st of this year, should the Bank seek to pursue its remedies. More significantly, the parties cannot agree on the proper approach to be taken to marketing the properties which everyone agrees must be sold. Should it be on a unit by unit conversion condominium basis (as the debtor proposes) or on an en bloc basis as the Bank would prefer? A Court appointed receiver with a mandate to develop a marketing plan can resolve that impasse, subject to the Court's approval, whereas a privately appointed receiver in all likelihood could not, at least without further litigious skirmishing. In the end, I am satisfied the interests of the debtors themselves, along with those of the creditors (and the tenants, who will be caught in the middle) and the orderly disposition of the property are all better served by the appointment of the receiver-manager as requested.

15 I am prepared, in the circumstances, however, to render the debtors one last chance to rescue the situation, if they can bring the potential Mutual Trust refinancing to fruition. I postpone the effectiveness of the order appointing Doane Raymond as receiver-manager for a period of three weeks from this date. If a refinancing arrangement which is satisfactory to the Bank and which is firm and concrete can be arranged by that time, I may be spoken to at a 9:30 appointment on Monday, June 24, 1996 with regard to a further postponement. The order will relate back to today's date, if taken out.

16 Should the Bank be advised to appoint Doane Raymond as a private receiver/manager under its mortgages in the interim, it may do so.

17 Counsel may attend at an earlier 9:30 appointment if necessary to speak to the form of the order.

Motions granted.

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2013 ONSC 6866
Ontario Superior Court of Justice [Commercial List]
Elleway Acquisitions Ltd. v. Cruise Professionals Ltd.

2013 CarswellOnt 16639, 2013 ONSC 6866, 235 A.C.W.S. (3d) 683

**Elleway Acquisitions Limited, Applicant and The Cruise Professionals Limited,
4358376 Canada Inc. (Operating as Itravel2000.com) and 7500106 Canada Inc.,
Respondents**

Morawetz J.

Heard: November 4, 2013
Judgment: November 4, 2013
Docket: CV-13-10320-00CL

Counsel: Jay Swartz, Natalie Renner, for Applicant
John N. Birch, for Respondents
David Bish, Lee Cassey, for Grant Thornton, Proposed Receiver

Subject: Civil Practice and Procedure; Corporate and Commercial; Insolvency

Headnote

Bankruptcy and insolvency

Civil practice and procedure

Debtors and creditors

Table of Authorities

Cases considered by *Morawetz J.*:

Anderson v. Hunking (2010), 2010 CarswellOnt 5191, 2010 ONSC 4008 (Ont. S.C.J.) — referred to

Bank of Montreal v. Carnival National Leasing Ltd. (2011), 74 C.B.R. (5th) 300, 2011 ONSC 1007, 2011 CarswellOnt 896 (Ont. S.C.J.) — referred to

Bank of Nova Scotia v. Freure Village on Clair Creek (1996), 1996 CarswellOnt 2328, 40 C.B.R. (3d) 274 (Ont.

Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Canadian Tire Corp. v. Healy (2011), 2011 ONSC 4616, 2011 CarswellOnt 7430, 81 C.B.R. (5th) 142 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Textron Financial Canada Ltd. v. Chetwynd Motels Ltd. (2010), 67 C.B.R. (5th) 97, 91 C.P.C. (6th) 171, 2010 CarswellBC 855, 2010 BCSC 477 (B.C. S.C. [In Chambers]) — referred to

Morawetz J.:

1 At the conclusion of argument, the requested relief was granted with reasons to follow. These are the reasons.

2 Elleway Acquisitions Limited ("Elleway" or the "Applicant") seeks an order (the "Receivership Order") appointing Grant Thornton Limited ("GTL") as receiver (the "Receiver"), without security, of all of the property, assets and undertaking of each of 4358376 Canada Inc., (operating as itravel2000.com ("itravel")), 7500106 Canada Inc., ("Travelcash"), and The Cruise Professionals ("Cruise") and together with itravel and Travelcash, "itravel Canada"), pursuant to section 243 of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (Canada)* (the "BIA") and section 101 of the *Courts of Justice Act (Ontario)* (the "CJA").

3 The application was not opposed.

4 The itravel Group (as defined below) is indebted to Elleway in the aggregate principal amount of £17,171,690 pursuant to a secured credit facility that was purchased by Elleway and a working capital facility that was established by Elleway. The indebtedness is guaranteed by each of itravel, Cruise and Travelcash, among others. The itravel Group is in default of the credit facility and the working capital facility, and Elleway has demanded repayment of the amounts owing thereunder. Elleway has also served each of itravel, Cruise and Travelcash with a notice of intention to enforce its security under section 244(1) of the BIA. Each of itravel, Cruise and Travelcash has acknowledged its inability to pay the indebtedness and consented to early enforcement pursuant to section 244(2) of the BIA.

5 Counsel to the Applicant submits that the itravel Group is insolvent and suffering from a liquidity crisis that is jeopardizing the itravel Group's continued operations. Counsel to the Applicant submits that the appointment of a receiver is necessary to protect itravel Canada's business and the interests of itravel Canada's employees, customers and suppliers.

6 Counsel further submits that itravel Canada's core business is the sale of travel services, including vacation, flight, hotel, car rentals, and insurance packages offered by third parties, to its customers. itravel Canada's business is largely seasonal and the majority of its revenues are generated in the months of October to March. itravel Canada would have to borrow approximately £3.1 million to fund its operations during this period and it is highly unlikely that another lender would be prepared to advance any funds to itravel Canada at this time given its financial circumstances.

7 Further, counsel contends that the Canadian travel agent business is an intensely competitive industry with a high profile among consumers, making it very easy for consumers to comparison shop to determine which travel agent can provide services at the lowest possible cost. Given its visibility in the consumer market and the travel industry, counsel submits that it is imperative that ittravel Canada maintain existing goodwill and the confidence of its customers. If ittravel Canada's business is to survive, potential customers must be assured that the business will continue uninterrupted and their advance payments for vacations will be protected notwithstanding ittravel Canada's financial circumstances.

8 Therefore, counsel submits that, if a receiver is not appointed at this critical juncture, there is a substantial risk that ittravel Canada will not be able to book trips and cruises during its most profitable period. This will result in a disruption to or, even worse, a complete cessation of ittravel Canada's business. Employees will resign, consumer confidence will be lost and existing goodwill will be irreparably harmed.

9 It is contemplated that if GTL is appointed as the Receiver, GTL intends to seek the Court's approval of the sale of substantially all of ittravel Canada's assets to certain affiliates of Elleway, who will operate the business of ittravel Canada as a going concern following the consummation of the purchase transactions. Counsel submits that, it is in the best interests of all stakeholders that the Receivership Order be made because it will facilitate a going concern sale of ittravel Canada's business, preserving consumer confidence, existing goodwill and the jobs of over 250 employees.

10 Elleway is a corporation incorporated under the laws of the British Virgin Islands. Elleway is an indirect wholly owned subsidiary of The Aldenham Grange Trust, a discretionary trust governed under Jersey law.

11 ittravel, Cruise and Travelcash are indirect wholly owned subsidiaries of Travelzest plc ("Travelzest"), a publicly traded United Kingdom ("UK") company that operates a group of companies that includes ittravel Canada (the "ittravel Group"). The ittravel Group's UK operations were closed in March 2013. Since the cessation of the ittravel Group's UK operations, all of the ittravel Group's remaining operations are based in Canada. ittravel Canada currently employs approximately 255 employees. ittravel Canada's employees are not represented by a union and it does not sponsor a pension plan for any of its employees.

12 The ittravel Group's primary credit facilities (the "Credit Facilities") were extended by Barclays Bank PLC ("Barclays") pursuant to a credit agreement (the "Credit Agreement") and corresponding fee letter (the "Fee Letter" and together with the Credit Agreement, the "Credit Facility Documents") under which Travelzest is the borrower.

13 Pursuant to a series of guarantees and security documents (the "Security Documents"), each of Travelzest, Travelzest Canco, Travelzest Holdings, Ittravel, Cruise and Travelcash guaranteed the obligations under the Credit Facility Documents and granted a security interest over all of its property to secure such obligations (the "Credit Facility Security"). Travelzest Canco and Travelzest Holdings are direct wholly owned UK subsidiaries of Travelzest. In addition, ittravel and Cruise granted a confirmation of security interest in certain intellectual property (the "IP Security Confirmation and together with the Credit Facility Security, the "Security").

14 The Security Documents provide the following remedies, among others, to the secured party, upon the occurrence of an event of default under the Credit Facility Documents: (a) the appointment by instrument in writing of a receiver; and (b) the institution of proceedings in any court of competent jurisdiction for the appointment of a receiver. The Security

Documents do not require Barclays to look to the property of Travelzest before enforcing its security against the property of ittravel Canada upon the occurrence of an event of default.

15 Commencing on or about April 2012, the ittravel Group began to default on its obligations under the Credit Agreement.

16 Pursuant to a series of letter agreements, Barclays agreed to, among other things, defer the applicable payment instalments due under the Credit Agreement until July 12, 2013 (the "Repayment Date"). Travelzest failed to pay any amounts to Barclays on the Repayment Date. Travelzest's failure to comply with financial covenants and its default on scheduled payments under the Repayment Plans constitute events of default under the Credit Facility Documents.

17 Since 2010, Itravel Canada has attempted to refinance its debt through various methods, including the implementation of a global restructuring plan and the search for a potential purchaser through formal and informal sales processes. Two formal sales processes yielded some interest from prospective purchasers. Ultimately, however, neither sales process generated a viable offer for Itravel Canada's assets or the shares of Travelzest.

18 Counsel submits that GTL has been working to familiarize itself with the business operations of Itravel Canada since August 2013 and that GTL is prepared to act as the Receiver of all of the property, assets and undertaking of ittravel Canada.

19 Counsel further submits that, if appointed as the Receiver, GTL intends to bring a motion (the "Sales Approval Motion") seeking Court approval of certain purchase transactions wherein Elleway, through certain of its affiliates, 8635919 Canada Inc. (the "ittravel Purchaser"), 8635854 Canada Inc. (the "Cruise Purchaser") and 1775305 Alberta Ltd. (the "Travelcash Purchaser" and together with the ittravel Purchaser and the Cruise Purchaser, the "Purchasers"), will acquire substantially all of the assets of ittravel Canada (the "Purchase Transactions").

20 If the Purchase Transactions are approved, Elleway has agreed to fund the ongoing operations of ittravel Canada during the receivership. It is the intention of the parties that the Purchase Transactions will close shortly after approval by the Court and it is not expected that the Receiver will require significant funding.

21 The purchase price for the Purchase Transactions will be comprised of cash, assumed liabilities and a cancellation of a portion of the Indebtedness. Elleway will supply the cash portion of the purchase price under each Purchase Transaction, which will be sufficient to pay any prior ranking secured claim or priority claim that is not being assumed.

22 The Purchasers intend to offer substantially all of the employees of ittravel and Cruise the opportunity to continue their employment with the Purchasers.

23 This motion raises the issue as to whether the Court should make an order pursuant to section 243 of the BIA and section 101 of the CJA appointing GTL as the Receiver.

1. The Court Should Make the Receivership Order

a. The Test for Appointing a Receiver under the BIA and the CJA

24 Section 243(1) of the BIA authorizes a court to appoint a receiver where such appointment is “just or convenient”.

25 Similarly, section 101(1) of the CJA provides for the appointment of a receiver by interlocutory order where the appointment is “just or convenient”.

26 In determining whether it is just and convenient to appoint a receiver under both statutes, a court must have regard to all of the circumstances of the case, particularly the nature of the property and the rights and interests of all parties in relation to the property. See *Bank of Nova Scotia v. Freure Village on Clair Creek*, [1996] O.J. No. 5088 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) at para. 10

27 Counsel to the Applicant submits that where the security instrument governing the relationship between the debtor and the secured creditor provides for a right to appoint a receiver upon default, this has the effect of relaxing the burden on the applicant seeking to have the receiver appointed. Further, while the appointment of a receiver is generally regarded as an extraordinary equitable remedy, courts do not regard the nature of the remedy as extraordinary or equitable where the relevant security document permits the appointment of a receiver. This is because the applicant is merely seeking to enforce a term of an agreement that was assented to by both parties. See *Textron Financial Canada Ltd. v. Chetwynd Motels Ltd.*, 2010 BCSC 477, [2010] B.C.J. No. 635 (B.C. S.C. [In Chambers]) at paras. 50 and 75; *Freure Village*, *supra*, at para. 12; *Canadian Tire Corp. v. Healy*, 2011 ONSC 4616, [2011] O.J. No. 3498 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at para. 18; *Bank of Montreal v. Carnival National Leasing Ltd.*, 2011 ONSC 1007, [2011] O.J. No. 671 (Ont. S.C.J.) at para. 27. I accept this submission.

28 Counsel further submits that in such circumstances, the “just or convenient” inquiry requires the court to determine whether it is in the interests of all concerned to have the receiver appointed by the court. The court should consider the following factors, among others, in making such a determination:

- (a) the potential costs of the receiver;
- (a) the relationship between the debtor and the creditors;
- (b) the likelihood of preserving and maximizing the return on the subject property; and
- (c) the best way of facilitating the work and duties of the receiver.

See *Freure Village*, *supra*, at paras. 10-12; *Canada Tire*, *supra*, at para. 18; *Carnival National Leasing*, *supra*, at paras 26-29; *Anderson v. Hunking*, 2010 ONSC 4008, [2010] O.J. No. 3042 (Ont. S.C.J.) at para. 15.

29 Counsel to the Applicant submits that it is just and convenient to appoint GTL as the Receiver in the circumstances of this case. As described above, the ittravel Group has defaulted on its obligations under the Credit Agreement and the Fee

Letter. Such defaults are continuing and have not been remedied as of the date of this Application. This has given rise to Elleway's rights under the Security Documents to appoint a receiver by instrument in writing and to institute court proceedings for the appointment of a receiver.

30 It is submitted that it is just and convenient, or in the interests of all concerned, for the Court to appoint GTL as the Receiver for five main reasons:

- (a) the potential costs of the receivership will be borne by Elleway;
- (a) the relationships between itravel Canada and its creditors, including Elleway, militate in favour of appointing GTL as the Receiver;
- (b) appointing GTL as the Receiver is the best way to preserve itravel Canada's business and maximize value for all stakeholders;
- (c) appointing GTL as the Receiver is the best way to facilitate the work and duties of the Receiver; and
- (d) all other attempts to refinance itravel Canada's debt or sell its assets have failed.

31 It is noted that Elleway has also served a notice of intention to enforce security under section 244(1) of the BIA. itravel Canada has acknowledged its inability to pay the Indebtedness and consented to early enforcement pursuant to section 244(2) of the BIA.

32 Further, if GTL is appointed as the Receiver and the Purchase Transactions are approved, the Purchasers will assume some of itravel Canada's liabilities and cancel a portion of the Indebtedness. Therefore, counsel submits that the appointment of GTL as the Receiver is beneficial to both itravel Canada and Elleway.

33 Counsel also points out that if GTL is appointed as the Receiver and the Purchase Transactions are approved by the Court, the business of itravel Canada will continue as a going concern and the jobs of substantially all of itravel Canada's employees will be saved.

34 Having considered the foregoing, I am of the view that the Applicant has demonstrated that it is both just and convenient to appoint GTL as Receiver of itravel Canada under both section 243 of the BIA and section 101 of the CJA. The Application is granted and the order has been signed in the form presented.

4

1995 CarswellOnt 39
Ontario Court of Justice (General Division — Commercial List)

Swiss Bank Corp. (Canada) v. Odyssey Industries Inc.

1995 CarswellOnt 39, [1995] O.J. No. 144, 30 C.B.R. (3d) 49, 53 A.C.W.S. (3d) 307

**SWISS BANK CORPORATION (CANADA) v. ODYSSEY INDUSTRIES
INCORPORATED and WESTON ROAD COLD STORAGE COMPANY**

Ground J.

Heard: December 7 and 15, 1994
Judgment: January 31, 1995
Docket: Docs. 94-CU-80416, B 280/94

Counsel: *Frank Newbould, Q.C.*, for plaintiff.
Alan J. Lenczner, Q.C. and *Linda L. Fuerst*, for defendants.

Subject: Corporate and Commercial; Insolvency

Related Abridgment Classifications

For all relevant Canadian Abridgment Classifications refer to highest level of case via History.

Headnote

Banking and Banks --- Loans and discounts — General

Creditors and Debtors --- General — Loans

Receivers --- Appointment — Application for appointment — Grounds

Secured creditors — Validity of loan — Where loan made by lending institution in contravention of statute or regulation, loan still enforceable.

Receivers — Application for appointment — Creditor under no obligation to prove that irreparable harm would result from failure to appoint receiver.

Two debtor companies were part of a group of companies carrying on a frozen food business. OI Inc. was a holding company and WR Co. was a limited partnership. The bank advanced a loan of \$47.5 million to a partnership in which OI Inc. was a partner. In return it received assignments of mortgages and a fixed and floating charge on all of OI Inc.'s assets. The loan was payable on demand.

The bank also made a loan not to exceed \$10,179,750 to WR Co. In return it received a collateral mortgage over two warehouses, a general security agreement over the assets and undertaking of WR Co. and guarantees by OI Inc. and JR, who controlled the group of companies.

The group of companies proposed a restructuring plan under which certain conveyances and transfers between the various companies were made. A master agreement provided that the restructuring plan would not be effected or would be reversed unless certain parts of the plan were settled to the satisfaction of the bank.

Both loans were in default. The bank brought a motion for the appointment of a receiver-manager of the property, undertaking and assets of OI Inc. and WR Co. The debtor companies argued that the bank was not entitled to the appointment of a receiver-manager because the loan to OI Inc. was illegal, having been made in breach of regulations under the *Bank Act*. They also argued that the bank was in breach of certain provisions of commitment letters related to both loans and in breach of its fiduciary duty to the companies as borrowers. Finally, they argued that, under s. 101 of the *Courts of Justice Act* (Ont.), a receiver-manager may be appointed by the court where it is just and convenient to do so. In the circumstances, they argued that it would be unjust and inequitable to make the appointment.

Held:

The motion was allowed.

There was no evidence to suggest that various transactions resulted in the security for the loans being in jeopardy or that the ability of the companies to repay the loans was materially affected in such a way as to require the appointment of a receiver-manager. However, defaults under both loans provided ample justification for the appointment of a receiver-manager. The bank was not required to establish that irreparable harm would result from the failure to appoint a receiver-manager. Further, under the master agreement the transfer of assets was reversed or deemed never to have taken place. Therefore, the bank would receive substantial benefit from the appointment of a receiver-manager.

There was no evidence to suggest that the companies would suffer undue or extreme hardship if a receiver-manager were appointed. The fact that a receiver-manager would not have the background and expertise of the companies' principal in running the business was not a reason to refuse the motion for appointment.

The loan to OI Inc. was not illegal because it was made by an institution that was not subject to the regulations under the *Bank Act*. Further, even if a loan is made in contravention of a statute or regulation governing the lending institution, the loan is still enforceable by the lending institution.

There was little evidence to establish a special relationship or exceptional circumstances such as would result in the bank owing the companies a fiduciary duty. The commercial transactions between the parties did not go beyond the normal relationship of lender and borrower. In any event, such allegations would have to be established in an action in damages against the bank. They did not constitute a reason to refuse to appoint a receiver-manager.

Table of Authorities

Cases considered:

Bank of Montreal v. Appcon Ltd. (1981), 37 C.B.R. (N.S.) 281, 33 O.R. (2d) 97, 123 D.L.R. (3d) 394 (S.C.) — referred to

Hodgkinson v. Simms, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 377, [1994] 9 W.W.R. 609, 97 B.C.L.R. (2d) 1, 22 C.C.L.T. (2d) 1, 117 D.L.R. (4th) 161, 171 N.R. 245, 6 C.C.L.S. 1, 57 C.P.R. (2d) 1, 16 B.L.R. (2d) 1, 5 E.T.R. (2d) 160, 49 B.C.A.C. 1, 40 W.A.C. 1 — *considered*

Sidmay Ltd. v. Wehttam Investments Ltd., [1967] 1 O.R. 508, 61 D.L.R. (2d) 358 (C.A.), affirmed [1968] S.C.R. 828, 69 D.L.R. (2d) 336 — *followed*

Statutes considered:

Bank Act (being Pt. 1 of s. 2 of Banks and Banking Law Revision Act, 1980, S.C. 1980-81-82-83, c. 40) [R.S.C. 1985, c. B-1].

Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C.

Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43 —

s. 101

Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.) —

s. 88

Motion by secured creditor for appointment of receiver-manager.

Ground J.:

1 This is a motion brought by the plaintiff, Swiss Bank Corporation (Canada) ("Swiss Bank") for the appointment of a receiver and manager of the property, undertaking and assets of the defendants, Odyssey Industries Incorporated ("Odyssey") and Weston Road Cold Storage Company ("Weston").

Factual Background

2 Odyssey and Weston are part of a group of entities controlled by Joseph Robichaud ("Robichaud") which carry on business in Ontario, Quebec and the Maritime Provinces. The business is based upon the storage of frozen foods in large cold-storage warehouse facilities. Other entities controlled by Robichaud either carry on, or carried on, similar business in Western Canada and in the United States.

3 Odyssey, a corporation controlled by Robichaud, was a holding company. It held 100% of the equity of Associated Freezers of Canada Inc. ("AFC"). AFC operated the freezer business under leases from limited partnerships controlled by Robichaud which held the beneficial ownership of the various cold-storage warehouse facilities. As a result of various transactions recently undertaken by one or more of the Robichaud entities, it is in issue as to which corporation or entity manages the business, or has beneficial ownership of the various warehouse properties at this time.

4 Seven cold-storage warehouse plants are registered in the name of 606327 Ontario Limited ("606327"). They are situated in Ontario, Quebec, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia and Newfoundland. Until recently, 606327 held the properties in trust for a limited partnership registered in Ontario as The Polar-Freez Limited Partnership ("Polar-Freez"). Ninety percent of the limited partnership units of Polar-Freez were owned by AFC.

5 Two cold-storage warehouse facilities are owned by the defendant Weston which is a limited partnership registered in Ontario.

6 On December 13, 1988, Swiss Bank advanced approximately \$47.5 million (the "Odyssey Loan") to Associated Investors Partnership ("Associated Investors"), one of the partners of which was Odyssey. The loan was repayable on demand. Associated Investors advanced the funds to Odyssey.

7 The security Swiss Bank received for the Odyssey Loan included:

(a) assignments by Odyssey of \$30 million and \$39 million mortgages (the "Polar-Freez Mortgages") from 606327 to Odyssey, each mortgage being registered over the seven cold-storage warehouse plants beneficially owned by Polar-Freez. The mortgage terms included an obligation to pay all taxes when due; and

(b) a fixed and floating charge debenture (the "Odyssey Debenture") in the amount of \$47.5 million given by Odyssey over all of its assets as a general and continuing collateral security. The Odyssey Debenture contained standard provisions dealing with events of default and remedies, including the right to apply to a court for the appointment of a receiver and manager.

8 The Odyssey Loan was payable on demand. By letters dated July 22, 1994, Swiss Bank demanded payment of outstanding arrears and principal to be made no later than September 6, 1994. Payment was not made. Principal outstanding as of November 20, 1994 was \$48,959,148.48. As of November 20, 1994, there was \$1,178,241.19 of arrears of interest owing.

9 Municipal property taxes on the seven Polar-Freez properties are in arrears of approximately \$2.5 million. These arrears have existed over various periods of time within the past two years.

10 On December 4, 1989, Swiss Bank agreed to renew an existing facility in favour of Weston in an amount not to exceed \$10,179,750 (the "Weston Loan"). The loan was repayable on December 31, 1994, or in the event of default, on demand.

11 The security Swiss Bank received for the Weston Loan included:

(a) a collateral mortgage in the amount of \$13 million over the two warehouses owned by Weston. The mortgage provided that Weston was to pay all municipal taxes when due;

(b) a general security agreement over the assets and undertaking of Weston containing standard terms describing the events of the default and remedies available, including the right of Swiss Bank to apply to court for the appointment of a

receiver and manager; and

(c) guarantees by Odyssey and Robichaud of the indebtedness of Weston to the amounts of \$13 million and \$3.5 million respectively.

12 Principal payments on the Weston Loan of \$150,000 were due on December 31 each year commencing in 1990. No payments of principal were made and therefore as of December 31, 1993, and thereafter, \$600,000 in principal payments were in arrears. The Weston Loan agreement provided for a hedge account to be funded by Weston. The purpose of this account was to provide protection to Swiss Bank as a hedge against any adverse movements in foreign exchange rates in the event that Weston transferred its obligations into Swiss francs. An initial deposit of \$1 million was made by Weston to the hedge account at the end of December 1989 as required. Further payments of \$350,000 per annum commencing on December 31, 1990 were required; however, the only payment made was a further \$15,000 payment on July 31, 1992. The hedge account is in arrears of \$1,040,000. Municipal tax arrears against the Weston properties of approximately \$1 million have been outstanding for approximately two years.

13 By letter dated July 22, 1994, Swiss Bank demanded payment in full of outstanding principal plus interest by September 6, 1994. Payment was not made. Principal outstanding as of November 29, 1994 was \$11,334,907.93. Loan interest payments have been in default since March 31, 1994. The amount of interest outstanding to November 29, 1994 is \$203,686.70.

14 In the Spring of 1994, the Robichaud Group presented a restructuring plan that included a reverse take-over of a new Robichaud corporation named Polar Corp. International ("Polar Corp.") by a V.S.E.-traded corporation.

15 The restructuring plan contemplated: (i) Polar Corp acquiring the seven warehouses from Polar-Freez; (ii) a transfer of AFC's ownership interest in Polar-Freez to a corporation named Pacific Eastern Equities Inc. ("Pacific Eastern"), a corporation controlled by Robichaud with no substantial assets; (iii) a winding-up of AFC under s. 88 of the *Income Tax Act*, and conveyance of its assets to Odyssey; (iv) a sale of the leasehold interest of Odyssey (now the tenant) in the seven warehouses to Polar Corp.

16 It appears from the documents before the court that certain conveyances and transfer documents and agreements were entered into pursuant to the restructuring plan and there are letters and memoranda before the court referring to certain assets having been transferred in accordance with the restructuring plan. There is also before the court a master agreement made as of October 31, 1994 (the "Master Agreement") among Odyssey, Weston, their affiliated companies, Robichaud and Swiss Bank, which appears to provide that the restructuring plan will not be effective, or to the extent that it has already been effected, it will be reversed, unless certain aspects of the restructuring plan have been settled to the satisfaction of Swiss Bank. Section 2.21 of the Master Agreement provides as follows:

If:

(a) by 5 p.m. on November 4, 1994, the matters referred to in Sections 2.17(c) and (d) and 2.18(b) shall not have been agreed to;

(b) any payment required under Section 2.20 shall not be made when due;

(c) by 5 p.m. on November 4, 1994 (i) the Robichaud Group shall not have provided SBCC with complete

particulars of the debts, obligations and liabilities (whether absolute or contingent, matured or not) of each of AFC and Odyssey (including, without limitation, obligations in respect of taxes), describing the creditor, the amount of the debt, obligation or liability and the nature thereof, or (ii) SBCC shall not be satisfied with the amount of such liabilities and that AFC shall have sufficient assets to and shall be able to satisfy all such debts, obligations and liabilities; or

(d) by 5 p.m. on November 4, 1994 SBCC shall not be satisfied as to the tax consequences of the transactions contemplated by this Agreement,

this Agreement shall terminate on notice by SBCC and shall be of no further force and effect.

17 It appears to be agreed that the conditions set out in s. 2.21 of the Master Agreement were not fulfilled.

Submissions

18 It is the position of counsel for Swiss Bank that the transfers of assets contemplated by the Master Agreement did in fact take place and that the cancellation of the leases to AFC which were assigned to Odyssey on the wind-up of AFC constituted a breach of the covenant of Odyssey contained in the Odyssey Debenture not to dispose of any part of the charged premises except in the ordinary course of business. It is his further submission that, if I should find that the transactions contemplated by the restructuring plan did not in fact take place, there is still ample evidence before the court that the Odyssey Loan and the Weston Loan were in default and that Swiss Bank is entitled to the appointment of a receiver.

19 With respect to the restructuring plan, counsel for Swiss Bank points out that a number of the letters and memoranda and several statements contained in the affidavits of Robichaud, all submitted to the court, refer to the transactions as having taken place and the assets having been transferred in accordance with the restructuring plan. There is no reference anywhere to the transfer documents being held in escrow pending the approval by Swiss Bank to the restructuring plan. He submits that the Master Agreement is of no legal effect in that Swiss Bank gave notice that it was not satisfied as to the tax aspects of the restructuring plan and, accordingly, the situation remains as it was before the Master Agreement was entered into.

20 With respect to other defaults, counsel for Swiss Bank refers to the following: the fact that interest is in arrears on the Odyssey Loan in an amount in excess of \$1,100,000; that demand has been made for payment of the principal of the Odyssey Loan and such payment has not been made; that there are tax arrears on the Polar-Freez properties in an amount in excess of \$2,500,000; that there are principal payments of \$600,000 in arrears on the Weston Loan, and that the annual payments of \$350,000 required to have been made to the hedge account under the Weston Loan have not been made; that there is interest in default on the Weston Loan in the amount of \$203,000; that there are municipal tax arrears on the Weston properties in amounts in excess of \$1,000,000; that a demand for payment of the principal amount of the Weston Loan has been made and that the principal has not been paid. It is his submission that, whether or not a transfer of assets in breach of the provisions of the Odyssey Debenture has occurred pursuant to the restructuring plan, the existence of all of the other defaults under the Odyssey Loan and the Weston Loan entitle Swiss Bank to the appointment of a court appointed receiver. It also appears to be his position that the transfer by Odyssey of certain term deposits to affiliates in the United States constitutes a diversion of funds from Odyssey such that the court ought to find that the security for the Odyssey Loan and the ability of Odyssey to repay the Odyssey Loan are in jeopardy.

21 Counsel for Odyssey and Weston submit that Swiss Bank is not entitled to the appointment of a receiver for a number of reasons. First, they submit that the Odyssey Loan is illegal and, accordingly, the security for such loan is void and

unenforceable. It is their position that the Odyssey Loan when originally made was in breach of regulations under the *Bank Act*, S.C. 1980-81-82-83, c. 40 (the "*Bank Act*") in that the loan could not be made by Swiss Bank as it would have been in breach of the large loan to capital ratios specified in regulations under the *Bank Act* and, accordingly, the loan was referred to Swiss Bank's parent corporation in Switzerland and was arranged through the parent corporation and one of its other affiliates.

22 Second, counsel alleges that Swiss Bank is in breach of certain provisions of the commitment letters for both the Odyssey Loan and the Weston Loan by refusing to agree to certain conversions of the loans from Swiss francs to Canadian dollars on several occasions at the request of the borrowers made pursuant to the terms of the commitment letters. In refusing to allow such conversions, counsel submit that Swiss Bank was not only in breach of the terms of the commitment letters, but was also in breach of its fiduciary duty to the borrowers in that Swiss Bank had undertaken to give advice to the borrowers as to the structure of the loans and as to currency conversions.

23 Third, counsel for Odyssey and Weston point out that Swiss Bank is not seeking the appointment of an interim receiver pending trial of this action, but is seeking the appointment of a court appointed receiver and manager to take over the business, undertaking and assets of Odyssey and Weston to enforce the security held by Swiss Bank and effect repayment of the Odyssey Loan and the Weston Loan. Counsel submit that under the provisions of s. 101 of the C.J.A., a receiver and manager may be appointed where it appears to a judge of the court to be just or convenient to do so, and that, in seeking the appointment of a receiver and manager, Swiss Bank is seeking an equitable remedy. It is the position of counsel for Odyssey and Weston that to appoint a receiver in this case would be unjust and inequitable. They submit that there is no risk of irreparable harm to Swiss Bank if a receiver is not appointed pending the trial of the oppression action commenced by Swiss Bank. There are certificates of pending litigation registered against the properties and there is an outstanding order restricting the disposition of any assets of Odyssey and Weston. In addition, Robichaud and the Robichaud group are prepared to give an undertaking to the court that there will be no expenditures of cash outside the ordinary course of business pending the trial of the action. It is further submitted that, if it is determined at trial that the assets have been transferred in accordance with the restructuring plan, there is very little in Odyssey for a receiver to administer and that, if it is determined that the assets remain in Odyssey and Polar-Freez, a sale of such assets by the receiver would result in a substantial tax liability and Swiss Bank would not recover an amount which would substantially decrease the principal amount of the Odyssey Loan. In addition, counsel submits that to appoint a receiver would be inequitable in view of Swiss Bank's acquiescence in the asset transfer since the Spring of 1994. Further, it is submitted, the appointment would result in extreme hardship to the borrowers, that Swiss Bank does not come to court with clean hands in view of its refusal to permit conversions of the loans and that any receiver and manager appointed to run the business of Odyssey and Weston would not have the background and experience of Robichaud in the operation of the business.

24 With respect to the diversion of funds to affiliates in the United States, counsel for Odyssey and Weston submit that there is no evidence that the transfer of the deposit receipts was for any improper purpose or was not in the ordinary course of business in view of the history of relationships among the Robichaud group of companies and, in any event, does not constitute evidence that the security for the Swiss Bank loans was in jeopardy or materially affect the ability of the borrowers to repay such loans.

Reasons

25 I shall deal first with the status of the restructuring plan and the effect of the Master Agreement. I accept the submission of counsel for Swiss Bank that there are many references in correspondence, memoranda and affidavits to the transactions contemplated by the restructuring plan having taken place and assets having been transferred and that there is no reference in any of such documents to the agreements or transfers having been made in escrow pending the approval of the restructuring plan by Swiss Bank. It seems to me, however, that the effect of the Master Agreement is either that such

transactions are reversed, or that they shall be deemed never to have taken place. Section 5.4 of the Master Agreement provides:

In case any of the conditions set out in Section 5.3 shall not have been fulfilled and/or performed within the time specified for such fulfilment and/or performance, or if SBCC determines that any condition might not be fulfilled or performed as required, SBCC may terminate this Agreement by notice in writing to the Robichaud Group. Each member of the Robichaud Group expressly acknowledges that its obligations to SBCC shall be deemed not to be assigned, transferred, amended or restated as contemplated hereby until all of the foregoing conditions precedent have been satisfied or waived in writing by SBCC. If such conditions be terminated under Section 2.21, this Agreement and all transactions contemplated hereby including, without limitation, the transactions contemplated by Article II shall be of no force or effect and the obligations of the Robichaud Group to SBCC and defaults under such obligations then existing shall continue and SBC shall be entitled immediately and without further notice or delay, to exercise any and all remedies available to it in respect of such defaults.

26 One could become embroiled in a metaphysical debate as to whether the effect of such section is that the transactions having taken place have been reversed or that the transactions are deemed never to have taken place. Whichever is the case, there has either been a default under the Odyssey Debenture which has been rectified, or no default under the Odyssey Debenture has taken place. Accordingly, it is not, in my view, grounds for the appointment of a receiver and manager by Swiss Bank. I am also not satisfied that the rather confused transactions involving the term deposits in the United States constitute grounds for the appointment of a receiver. It appears that the transfers of the term deposits to the United States were for valid business reasons, i.e. to provide security for the performance of a lease or for the approval of a proposal under c. 11. There is no evidence to support the contention of counsel for Swiss Bank that the failure to reflect one of the transfers of such term deposits on the books of AFC was part of some nefarious plot to divert assets of the Robichaud Group companies. Accordingly, I am not persuaded that these transactions constitute a basis for determining that the security for the loans was in jeopardy, or that the ability of Odyssey and Weston to pay the loans was materially effected by these transactions so as to satisfy the court that it would be just and convenient on this ground to appoint a receiver and manager.

27 It appears, however, that the other defaults under both the Odyssey Loan and the Weston Loan referred to by counsel for Swiss Bank, would of themselves provide ample justification for the appointment of a receiver and manager. One must then consider the submissions made by counsel for Odyssey and Weston that, in this case, it would be unjust and inequitable to order such appointment.

28 The first submission of counsel for Odyssey and Weston is that there is no risk of irreparable harm to Swiss Bank if a receiver is not appointed as certificates of pending litigation have been filed against the real estate properties involved, and there is an existing order restraining the disposition of other assets. I know of no authority for the proposition that a creditor must establish irreparable harm if the appointment of a receiver is not granted by the court. In fact, the authorities seem to support the proposition that irreparable harm need not be demonstrated (see *Bank of Montreal v. Appcon Ltd.* (1981), 33 O.R. (2d) 97 (S.C.)).

29 The second submission of counsel for Odyssey and Weston is that there would be no substantial benefit to Swiss Bank resulting from the appointment in that, if it is determined that the assets have been transferred to Polar Corp., there is very little in Odyssey for a receiver to administer. Having found that the effect of the termination of the Master Agreement is that either the transfer of assets has been reversed or is deemed not to have taken place, substantial assets remain in Odyssey and its subsidiaries and a receiver would be in a position to administer such assets and business or to realize upon them to satisfy the indebtedness owing to Swiss Bank. Accordingly, I do not accept the submission that there is no substantial benefit to Swiss Bank from the appointment of a receiver.

30 Counsel for Odyssey and Weston submit that Swiss Bank acquiesced in the transfer of assets since the Spring of 1994, and that accordingly, it would be inequitable to appoint a receiver at this time. My reading of the material before this court is that, although Swiss Bank was aware of the intended restructuring plan and the motivation for such plan, it was concerned throughout about the effect that such plan would have on its security position and the tax ramifications of such plan, and at no time indicated its acquiescence in, or approval of, the plan.

31 With respect to the hardship to Odyssey and Weston should a receiver be appointed, I am unable to find any evidence of undue or extreme hardship. Obviously the appointment of a receiver always causes hardship to the debtor in that the debtor loses control of its assets and business and may risk having its assets and business sold. The situation in this case is no different. If the borrowers are able to arrange new financing to pay off the loan, the receiver will be discharged and there appear to be no unusual circumstances prohibiting Odyssey and Weston from seeking new financing to pay off the outstanding loans to Swiss Bank and regaining control of their assets and business. Similarly, the fact that any receiver and manager appointed would not have the background and expertise in running the business that Robichaud has is no reason not to grant the appointment. In most situations, the receiver and manager will not have the same expertise as the principals of the debtor and may retain the principals to manage the day-to-day operation of the business during the receivership period. This circumstance does not in my view establish that it would be unjust or inequitable to appoint a receiver.

32 The first submission of counsel for Odyssey and Weston is that the Odyssey Loan was illegal and accordingly the security for such loan is void and unenforceable. The illegality is alleged to have arisen from the fact that Swiss Bank would not have been able to make the original loan to Odyssey itself without being in breach of certain regulations under the *Bank Act*. I am unable to accept this submission for two reasons. The initial loan made in 1985 has been repaid and it is security for the new loan made in 1989 which is now sought to be enforced. There is so far as I am aware no allegations that Swiss Bank was unable to make the new loan in 1989. In any event, Swiss Bank did not make the original 1985 loan; rather, it arranged for the loan to be made by its parent company in Switzerland and an European affiliate of its parent company, neither of whom would have been subject to the regulations under the *Bank Act*. Accordingly, I fail to see how the original loan could be said to be illegal when the loan was not made by an institution subject to the regulations under the *Bank Act*. Moreover, the decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal in *Sidmay Ltd. v. Wehttam Investments*, [1967] 1 O.R. 508, affirmed [1968] S.C.R. 828 would seem to stand for the proposition that, even if a loan is made in contravention of a statute or regulation governing the lending institution, such loan is still enforceable by the lending institution.

33 Counsel for Odyssey and Weston further submit that Swiss Bank did not come to court with clean hands in view of the fact that it was in breach of the provisions of the commitment letters governing the Odyssey Loan and the Weston Loan by virtue of its failure to allow certain currency conversions, and was also in breach of its fiduciary duty to the borrowers in that it had undertaken to give advice with respect to the structure of the loans and the provision for currency conversion. I can see that the language of the two commitment letters dealing with currency conversions is not abundantly clear and there is little evidence before this court as to whether the requests for currency conversions were properly made on the appropriate dates and with the appropriate notice.

34 There is also very little evidence before this court to establish that this is a situation of special relationship or exceptional circumstances where a lender would be found to have a fiduciary duty to its borrower in that the relationship between them goes beyond the normal relationship of borrower and lender. The Supreme Court of Canada recently dealt with the law of fiduciaries in *Hodgkinson v. Simms*, September 30, 1994, (unreported) [now reported at [1994] 9 W.W.R. 609]. At pp. 20-22 [pp. 629-630] of his reasons, LaForest J. stated:

In *LAC Minerals* I elaborated further on the approach proposed by Wilson J. in *Frame v. Smith*. I there identified three uses of the term fiduciary, only two of which I thought were truly fiduciary. The first is in describing certain relationships that have as their essence discretion, influence over interests, and an *inherent* vulnerability. In these types

of relationships, there is a rebuttable presumption, arising out of the inherent purpose of the relationship, that one party has a duty to act in the best interests of the other party. Two obvious examples of this type of fiduciary relationship are trustee-beneficiary and agent-principal. In seeking to determine whether new classes of relationships are per se fiduciary, Wilson J.'s three-step analysis is a useful guide.

As I noted in *LAC Minerals*, however, the three-step analysis proposed by Wilson J. encounters difficulties in identifying relationships described by a slightly different use of the term "fiduciary", viz., situations in which fiduciary obligations, though not innate to a given relationship, arise as a matter of fact out of the specific circumstances of that particular relationship ... In these cases, the question to ask is whether, given all the surrounding circumstances, one party could reasonably have expected that the other party would act in the former's best interests with respect to the subject matter at issue. Discretion, influence, vulnerability and trust were mentioned as non-exhaustive examples of evidential factors to be considered in making this determination.

Thus, outside the established categories, what is required is evidence of a mutual understanding that one party has relinquished its own self-interest and agreed to act solely on behalf of the other party. ...

In relation to the advisory context, then, there must be something more than a simple undertaking by one party to provide information and execute orders for the other for a relationship to be enforced as fiduciary. For example, most everyday transactions between a bank customer and banker are conducted on a creditor-debtor basis; see *Canadian Pioneer Management Ltd. v. Saskatchewan (Labour Relations Board)*, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 433; *Thermo King Corp. v. Provincial Bank of Canada* (1981), 34 O.R. (2d) 369 (C.A.), leave to appeal refused, [1982] 1 S.C.R. xi (note)

35 La Forest J. then makes the following comments about commercial transactions at pp. 26-27 [pp. 632-633]:

Commercial interactions between parties at arm's length normally derive their social utility from the pursuit of self-interest, and the courts are rightly circumspect when asked to enforce a duty (i.e., the fiduciary duty) that vindicates the very antithesis of self-interest ... No doubt it will be a rare occasion where parties, in all other respects independent, are justified in surrendering their self-interest such as to invoke the fiduciary principle.

36 The commercial transactions among the parties to this action do not appear to me to be those rare occasions where the fiduciary principle would be invoked.

37 In any event, in my view, such allegations of breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty would have to be established by the borrowers in an action in damages against Swiss Bank and such damages may well be offset against the amounts owing under the Odyssey Loan and the Weston Loan. The fact that such allegations are being made at this time does not, however, constitute a reason for refusing to grant the appointment of a receiver at this time or convince me that it would be unjust or inequitable to do so. It has not been suggested that the damages which might be awarded to Odyssey and Weston, should they be successful in any such action, would be sufficient to pay off the Odyssey Loan and the Weston Loan. In fact, the limited evidence before the court as to the damages to which Odyssey and Weston would be entitled would seem to indicate that such damages would fall far short of the amount necessary to pay off the two loans.

38 In summary, although I am not satisfied that at this time there exists any default resulting from a transfer of assets pursuant to the restructuring plan or that the transfer of the deposit receipts to affiliates in the United States constitutes grounds for the appointment of a receiver, the existence of the other defaults with respect to interest payments, principal payments, arrears of taxes and failure to pay principal on demand, in my view, justifies the appointment of a receiver and none of the submissions put forward by counsel for Odyssey and Weston convinces me that it would be unjust or inequitable to grant such appointment.

39 Accordingly, an order will issue, substantially in the form of the order annexed as Sched. "A" to the notice of motion, appointing Coopers & Lybrand Limited as receiver and manager of the property, undertakings and assets of Odyssey and Weston. If counsel are unable to settle the terms of such order, they may attend upon me. Counsel may also make oral or written submissions to me as to the costs of this motion.

Motion allowed.

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2010 BCSC 477
British Columbia Supreme Court [In Chambers]

Textron Financial Canada Ltd. v. Chetwynd Motels Ltd.

2010 CarswellBC 855, 2010 BCSC 477, [2010] B.C.W.L.D. 4567, [2010] B.C.W.L.D. 4568, [2010] B.C.J. No. 635,
67 C.B.R. (5th) 97, 91 C.P.C. (6th) 171

**Textron Financial Canada Limited (Plaintiff) and Chetwynd Motels Ltd.,
Northern Hotels Limited Partnership, Northern Hotels GP Ltd., Pomeroy
Enterprises Ltd., 711970 Alberta Ltd., William Robert Pomeroy and Carrie
Langstroth (Defendants)**

Willcock J.

Heard: February 10, 2010
Judgment: April 9, 2010
Docket: Vancouver S100268

Counsel: W.E.J. Skelly, B. La Borie for Plaintiff
A. Brown for Defendants

Subject: Corporate and Commercial; Civil Practice and Procedure; Insolvency

Related Abridgment Classifications

For all relevant Canadian Abridgment Classifications refer to highest level of case via History.

Headnote

Debtors and creditors --- Receivers — Appointment — General principles

Defendants C Ltd. and NHLP built, owned, and operated hotel — Plaintiff lent money to C Ltd. for development and construction of hotel on terms in loan agreement — C Ltd. executed promissory note — Other transactions were executed as additional security — Default occurred — Plaintiff demanded payment from C Ltd. and NHLP, issued notice of intention to enforce security under s. 244 of Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, and made demand upon defendant guarantors — Plaintiff brought action — Plaintiff brought application for, inter alia, order appointing receiver — Application granted in part — Just and convenient to grant receivership order — As parties stipulated in their contracts that plaintiff would be entitled to appoint receiver or apply for court-appointed receiver in event of default, relief sought not extraordinary — Defendants owed plaintiff significant sum, and had not reduced principal debt — No dispute as to amount of debt, nor that defendants were in default — No imminent prospect of repayment of principal from operations — There had not been full disclosure of defendants' refinancing plans — Interim plan to make partial payments would not indemnify plaintiff against interest accumulating in interim — No assurance interim payments could be made — There was risk to plaintiff's equity and doubt regarding prospect of recovery of principal — Defendants' plans did not provide for indemnity to plaintiff for losses incurred on ongoing basis — There was inadequate provision to minimize irreparable losses lender would incur — No persuasive evidence appointment of receiver would cause defendants undue hardship — Plaintiff should not have to leave its interests in hands of defendants.

Debtors and creditors --- Receivers — Order appointing receiver

Defendants C Ltd. and NHLP built, owned, and operated hotel — Plaintiff, commercial lender, lent money to C Ltd. for development and construction of hotel on terms in loan agreement — C Ltd. executed promissory note — Other transactions were executed as additional security — Default occurred — Plaintiff made demand upon C Ltd. and NHLP for payment, and issued notice of intention to enforce security under provisions of s. 244 of Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act — Demand was also made upon defendant guarantors — Plaintiff brought action — Plaintiff brought application for order appointing receiver, and that receiver have conduct of sale of hotel, subject to court approval — Application granted in part — Balancing rights of parties, it was just and convenient to grant receivership order — Order appointing receiver would not authorize receiver to have conduct of sale of hotel — As conduct of sale precluded redemption, order sought was inconsistent with affording defendants redemption period — Special circumstances did not exist such that plaintiff should have order for sale before judgment and consideration of appropriate redemption period — It was not clear that value of security was diminishing — To contrary, there was some evidence that profitability and therefore value of hotel was likely to increase in interim — Some net income was being generated from operations — Receiver would be authorized to engage only in such sales as would occur in ordinary course of business of hotel.

Table of Authorities

Cases considered by *Willcock J.*:

Bank of Montreal v. Appcon Ltd. (1981), 37 C.B.R. (N.S.) 281, 123 D.L.R. (3d) 394, 1981 CarswellOnt 162, 33 O.R. (2d) 97 (Ont. H.C.) — referred to

Bank of Nova Scotia v. Mrazek (1985), 64 B.C.L.R. 282, 1985 CarswellBC 191 (B.C. C.A.) — considered

BG International Ltd. v. Canadian Superior Energy Inc. (2009), 2009 CarswellAlta 469, 2009 ABCA 127, 53 C.B.R. (5th) 161, 71 C.P.C. (6th) 156, 457 A.R. 38, 457 W.A.C. 38 (Alta. C.A.) — considered

Canlan Investment Corp. v. Gibbons (1983), [1983] 3 W.W.R. 225, 42 B.C.L.R. 199, 1983 CarswellBC 7 (B.C. S.C.) — considered

Citibank Canada v. Calgary Auto Centre (1989), 58 D.L.R. (4th) 447, 98 A.R. 250, 75 C.B.R. (N.S.) 74, 1989 CarswellAlta 343 (Alta. Q.B.) — considered

Devany v. Brackpool (1981), 1981 CarswellBC 266, 31 B.C.L.R. 256, 21 R.P.R. 100, 127 D.L.R. (3d) 498 (B.C. S.C. [In Chambers]) — considered

Eaton Bay Trust Co. v. Motherlode Developments Ltd. (1984), 50 C.B.R. (N.S.) 247, 1984 CarswellBC 548, 50 B.C.L.R. 149 (B.C. S.C.) — considered

First Pacific Credit Union v. Grimwood Sports Inc. (1984), 59 B.C.L.R. 145, 16 D.L.R. (4th) 181, 56 C.B.R. (N.S.) 7, 1984 CarswellBC 605 (B.C. C.A.) — considered

First Western Capital Ltd. v. Wardle (1982), 1982 CarswellBC 2252 (B.C. S.C.) — referred to

Korion Investments Corp. v. Vancouver Trade Mart Inc. (1993), 1993 CarswellBC 2061 (B.C. S.C. [In Chambers]) — considered

Maple Trade Finance Inc. v. CY Oriental Holdings Ltd. (2009), 60 C.B.R. (5th) 142, 2009 BCSC 1527, 2009 CarswellBC 2982 (B.C. S.C. [In Chambers]) — considered

Paragon Capital Corp. v. Merchants & Traders Assurance Co. (2002), 2002 CarswellAlta 1531, 2002 ABQB 430, 316 A.R. 128, 46 C.B.R. (4th) 95 (Alta. Q.B.) — considered

Player v. Crompton & Co. (1914), [1914] 1 Ch. 954 (Eng. Ch. Div.) — referred to

Pope v. Roberts (1979), 1979 CarswellBC 6, 10 B.C.L.R. 50 (B.C. C.A.) — referred to

Pratchett v. Drew (1924), [1923] All E.R. Rep. 685, [1924] 1 Ch. 280 (Eng. Ch. Div.) — referred to

Red Burrito Ltd. v. Hussain (2007), 2007 CarswellBC 1936, 2007 BCSC 1277, 33 B.L.R. (4th) 205 (B.C. S.C.) — considered

Ross v. Ross Mining Ltd. (2009), 2009 YKSC 55, 2009 CarswellYukon 123, 57 C.B.R. (5th) 77 (Y.T. S.C.) — referred to

Royal Bank v. Astor Hotel Ltd. (1986), 1986 CarswellBC 487, 3 B.C.L.R. (2d) 252, 62 C.B.R. (N.S.) 257 (B.C. C.A.) — considered

Royal Bank v. Cal Glass Ltd. (1978), 29 C.B.R. (N.S.) 302, 94 D.L.R. (3d) 84, 1978 CarswellBC 303, 8 B.C.L.R. 345 (B.C. S.C.) — considered

Royal Bank v. Camex Canada Corp. (1985), 63 B.C.L.R. 125, 1985 CarswellBC 137 (B.C. S.C.) — referred to

Royal Trust Corp. of Canada v. Exeter Properties Ltd. (February 28, 1985), Doc. Vancouver H850260 (B.C. S.C. [In Chambers]) — referred to

South West Marine Estates Ltd. v. Bank of British Columbia (1985), 1985 CarswellBC 249, 65 B.C.L.R. 328, 37 R.P.R. 137 (B.C. C.A.) — referred to

Truman & Co. v. Redgrave (1881), 18 Ch. 547 (Eng. Ch. Div.) — referred to

United Savings Credit Union v. F & R Brokers Inc. (2003), 2003 CarswellBC 1084, 2003 BCSC 640, 15 B.C.L.R. (4th) 347, 9 R.P.R. (4th) 279 (B.C. S.C. [In Chambers]) — considered

Vista Homes Ltd. v. Taplow Financial Ltd. (1985), 64 B.C.L.R. 291, 1985 CarswellBC 470, 56 C.B.R. (N.S.) 225 (B.C. S.C.) — considered

Statutes considered:

Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3
s. 244 — referred to

Law and Equity Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 253
Generally — referred to

s. 15 — considered

s. 39(1) — considered

Personal Property Security Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 359
Generally — referred to

s. 66 — considered

Rules considered:

Rules of Court, 1990, B.C. Reg. 221/90
R. 12 — pursuant to

R. 44 — pursuant to

R. 47(1) — referred to

R. 51A [en. B.C. Reg. 367/2000] — pursuant to

R. 57 — pursuant to

APPLICATION by plaintiff for order appointing receiver, and that receiver have conduct of sale of certain property.

Willcock J.:

Introduction

1 Textron Financial Canada Limited ("Textron") applies pursuant to Rules 12, 44, 51A and 57 of the *Rules of Court*, the *Law and Equity Act*, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 253, and the *Personal Property Security Act*, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 359, for an order appointing a receiver/manager of all of the assets, undertakings and properties of Chetwynd Motels Ltd. ("Chetwynd") and Northern Hotels Limited Partnership ("NHLP"), and certain property of the other defendants located at 5200 North Access Road, Chetwynd British Columbia, on District Lot 398 of Peace River District Plans 9830, 13879 and 27449 (the "Lands"). In particular Textron seeks an order empowering the receiver to sell an 87-suite hotel known as Pomeroy Inn Chetwynd (the "Hotel") built on the Lands.

Background

2 Textron is a commercial lender. Chetwynd, Northern Hotels GP Ltd. ("Northern Hotels"), Pomeroy Enterprises Ltd. ("Pomeroy") and 711970 Alberta Ltd. ("711970") are companies incorporated in Alberta. Chetwynd, Northern Hotels and Pomeroy are extraprovincially registered in British Columbia. NHLP is an Alberta limited partnership, extraprovincially registered in British Columbia.

3 Chetwynd and NHLP built, own and operate the Hotel.

4 Textron lent money to Chetwynd for the development and construction of the Hotel on the following terms, set out in a loan agreement dated January 31, 2007 (the "Loan Agreement"):

- (a) Textron provided a construction short-term loan facility of up to the principal amount of \$7,500,000;
- (b) interest accrued on the principal amount outstanding at the Bank of Canada 30-day banker acceptance rate plus 2.85%; and
- (c) in the event of default, Textron would be entitled to a prepayment charge of 3% of the outstanding principal together with costs of collection, including solicitor fees and disbursements.

5 On January 31, 2007 Chetwynd executed a promissory note by which it promised to pay on demand the lesser of the principal sum of \$7.5 million plus interest or the unpaid principal balance on all advances. As additional security the following were executed on the same date:

- (a) a mortgage from Chetwynd to Textron, registered against the Lands (the "Mortgage");
- (b) an assignment of rents from Chetwynd to Textron, also registered against the Lands;
- (c) a trust agreement between Chetwynd, NHLP and Textron, whereby NHLP, as beneficial owner of the Lands, granted a mortgage and charge to Textron of all of its real or personal property interests in the Land;
- (d) a general security agreement from Chetwynd and NHLP granting a security interest in favour of Textron over

the undertaking of Chetwynd and NHLP (the “General Security Agreement”);

(e) a guarantee and postponement of claims from NHLP to Textron;

(f) a guarantee from Pomeroy and William Robert Pomeroy (the “Pomeroy guarantors”) of two thirds of the amount outstanding to Textron under the Loan Agreement, to a maximum of \$5,000,000, and a postponement of claims in favour of Textron;

(g) a guarantee from 711970 and Carrie Langstroth (the “Langstroth guarantors”) of one third of the amount outstanding to Textron under the Loan Agreement, to a maximum of \$2,500,000, and a postponement of claims in favour of Textron; and

(h) a general security agreement from Pomeroy and 711970 in favour of Textron which granted a security interest in favour of Textron over the undertaking and assets of Pomeroy and 711970 (the “Collateral General Security Agreement”).

6 By May 1, 2007 Textron had advanced the entirety of the loan to Chetwynd. The Hotel was substantially complete by May 18, 2007.

7 The Loan Agreement required Chetwynd to make monthly payments of interest only for a period of 12 months from substantial completion. Thereafter Chetwynd was to make monthly payments of principal and interest based on a 25-year amortization period. Chetwynd agreed to maintain a debt service coverage ratio of not less than 0.30.

8 For the months from September to December 2009, Chetwynd failed to make required payments of principal and interest. Chetwynd did not maintain the debt service coverage ratio and failed to provide the financial reporting that was called for under the Loan Agreement. By September 30, 2009 Chetwynd’s debt service ratio was 0.47.

9 On November 10, 2009, Textron made demand upon Chetwynd and NHLP for payment of \$7,509,585.54, the amount then said to be owing, and issued a notice of intention to enforce security pursuant to the provisions of s. 244 of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3. A demand was also made upon the guarantors. On November 24, 2008, Textron notified Chetwynd that it was in default of the Loan Agreement in that it had failed to meet the debt service coverage ratio. Textron then required Chetwynd to remedy its default. Chetwynd failed to do so.

10 The General Security Agreement provides that in the case of default, Textron is entitled to appoint a receiver, by court order or otherwise, over the undertaking and personal property of Chetwynd and NHLP. The Mortgage provides that in the event of default, Textron is entitled to appoint a receiver by court order or otherwise over the Lands. The Collateral General Security Agreement also provides that in the event of default, Textron is entitled to appoint a receiver, by court order or otherwise, over the interests of the guarantors in the Lands or Hotel.

11 On January 13, 2010, this action was commenced by Textron. The relief sought in the writ of summons includes:

(1) declaration that Textron is the holder of a fixed and specific charge against all of the undertaking, property and assets of Chetwynd and NHLP, and the assets of Pomeroy and 711970 in relation to the Lands and the Hotel;

- (2) judgment against Chetwynd, NHLP and Northern Hotels in the amount of \$7,509,585.54 to November 9, 2009 and interest thereon at the rate set out in the security agreements;
- (3) judgment against the Pomeroy guarantors in the amount of \$5,000,000 to November 10, 2009 plus costs and interest thereafter;
- (4) judgment against the Langstroth guarantors in the amount of \$2,500,000 as of November 10, 2009 plus all other applicable costs and interests;
- (5) appointment of a receiver or receiver/manager over the Lands and over all of the undertaking, property and assets of Chetwynd and NHLP and over the undertaking, property and assets of Pomeroy and 711970 in relation to the Lands and the Hotel; and
- (6) an order that the Lands and the assets secured by Textron be sold free and clear of the right, title and interest of the defendants or an order that the receiver appointed shall sell the Lands and assets subject to further court order.

12 William Pomeroy describes himself as the president of a group of companies referred to as the "Pomeroy Group". The group operates and manages hotels and restaurants in British Columbia and Alberta, including the Hotel, the Pomeroy Inn Chetwynd. Mr. Pomeroy has produced financial reports and month-to-month statistics on the operations of the Hotel for the year prior to December 2009, inclusive, as well as the 2010 budget for the Hotel with comparable 2009 results.

13 It is Mr. Pomeroy's evidence that the Hotel is operating at a slightly better than break-even basis, excluding its financing costs. It has been meeting and is expected to meet its ongoing obligations other than financing expenses. The property is fully insured and the owners are prepared to make regular disclosure of financial information to the plaintiff.

14 Mr. Pomeroy deposes that when the Hotel was developed, the local economy was robust as a result of the health of local resource-extraction industries but the market has since been severely impacted by economic factors, including the closure of a sawmill; the closure of a pulp mill; the suspension of operations at a local coal mine; a dramatic decrease in natural gas prices; and the discontinuance of the operations of a local wind farm. According to Mr. Pomeroy, a reduction in occupancy rates and gross revenues has rendered NHLP unable to make monthly payments on its loan. He cannot say when he expects the business to become more profitable, but believes that in the long term the Hotel will be successful.

15 Mr. Pomeroy deposes that the "Pomeroy Group" is currently in negotiations with lenders to refinance and restructure some of its operations, including the Hotel. He says the restructuring "can be well underway toward completion within the next six months". In his opinion the appointment of a receiver "could have a serious negative impact on our ability to carry out the restructuring".

16 The budget and financial statement produced by Mr. Pomeroy indicate that annual revenue to December 2009 amounted to approximately \$1.7 million. After deducting non-financial expenses, the Hotel earned net operating income of \$202,000. After depreciation and amortization, interest and financial expenses, the Hotel suffered a loss of \$1.45 million. The budget for 2010 will see the Hotel generating net operating income of \$457,000 before depreciation, amortization, interest and finance expenses. Interest and financing expenses alone are anticipated to be \$489,000. If it meets its budget, the Hotel will not be able to pay all interest and financing expenses. After depreciation, amortization and the interest and principal payments on its loan, the Hotel, on its own budget, will show a net loss of \$1.12 million. That budget calls for revenue of \$1.96 million compared to 2009 revenue of \$1.69 million. The significant increase in revenue is based upon significantly higher projected revenue in the summer and fall of 2010.

17 Chetwynd proposes to make an immediate payment to Textron in the amount of \$20,000, and to pay all interest accruing to Textron on a monthly basis, approximately \$20,000 per month, while the Pomeroy Group is pursuing restructuring.

18 Textron regards the 2010 budget forecast as optimistic. Textron is of the view that based on actual and projected results, it will not be possible for Chetwynd to raise sufficient funds by refinancing or selling the Hotel to satisfy the outstanding debt to Textron. Although Mr. Pomeroy deposes to attempts to refinance or restructure the operation, there is no assurance that Textron will be paid in full in the event refinancing is obtained, and Textron has not received details of the proposed refinancing from Chetwynd.

Issues

19 The following issues arise on this application:

1. whether a receiver should be appointed; and, if so
2. whether the receiver should have conduct of sale of the undertaking and property of the Hotel prior to judgment and without a redemption period.

20 The first question requires consideration of the test to be applied on an application for the appointment of a receiver. The parties say the law in this regard is unsettled. The plaintiff says that a receiver should be appointed on the application of a creditor as a matter of course in every case where there has clearly been default unless there is a “compelling commercial reason” to delay the appointment. The defendants say that the statutory requirement that it be just and convenient that the order be made requires a balancing of interests in every case and that the significant detriment to a debtor arising from the appointment of a receiver should lead the court to require the applicant to establish that the balance of convenience favours the appointment.

Applicable Law

Court-Appointed Receivers

21 Section 39(1) of *The Law and Equity Act* describes the jurisdiction to appoint receivers, generally, in terms of justice and convenience:

39(1) An injunction or an order in the nature of *mandamus* may be granted or a receiver or receiver manager appointed by an interlocutory order of the court in all cases in which it appears to the court to be just or convenient that the order should be made.

22 Section 66 of *The Personal Property Security Act*, in addition to the court's general jurisdiction, authorizes the appointment of receivers on the application of interested persons in the event of default under security agreements governed by the provisions of that *Act*.

23 The *Rules of Court* provide the appointment may be on terms:

47(1) The court may appoint a receiver in any proceeding either unconditionally or on terms, whether or not the appointment of a receiver was included in the relief claimed by the applicant.

24 In *Red Burrito Ltd. v. Hussain*, 2007 BCSC 1277 (B.C. S.C.), D. Smith J. (as she then was) said at para. 47: "It is well-established that the party seeking an appointment of a receiver by the court must satisfy the court that it is just and convenient to do so: see *Korion Investments Corp. v. Vancouver Trade Mart Inc.* [citation deleted]."

25 The plaintiff says a mortgagee is entitled to the appointment of receiver or a receiver/manager as a matter of course when a mortgage is in default. The plaintiff says it is just and convenient to give effect to the intentions of the parties reflected in the security agreements. This was the approach adopted by McDonald J. in *Citibank Canada v. Calgary Auto Centre* (1989), 58 D.L.R. (4th) 447 (Alta. Q.B.), citing from Price and Trussler, *Mortgage Actions in Alberta* (1985) at 309:

Unless the mortgagor can point to reasons why the appointment of a receiver will prejudice his position, it is difficult to see why the mortgagee should not be entitled to a receiver, regardless of the equity position. The fact that there may be sufficient to pay the mortgage out if the property is ultimately sold is of little comfort to the mortgagee, who is faced with the prospect of no regular monthly return on his investment on which he may be budgeting, particularly where he holds the mortgage in trust for an investor. In addition, in considering what is "just and equitable" the Court must surely have regard to the mortgage covenant, which normally contains an express covenant agreeing to the appointment of a receiver in the event of default, and to the fact that although the mortgagor is receiving the rents, he is pocketing them or diverting them to other investments instead of paying the mortgage on the property as he has covenanted to do. In weighing the equities in this fashion, it is difficult to come down on the side of the defaulting mortgagor/landlord. Instead, it is "just and equitable" that a receiver be appointed.

26 This judgment was cited with approval by Burnyeat J. in *United Savings Credit Union v. F & R Brokers Inc.*, 2003 BCSC 640, 15 B.C.L.R. (4th) 347 (B.C. S.C. [In Chambers]) (followed in *Ross v. Ross Mining Ltd.*, 2009 YKSC 55 (Y.T. S.C.)). In that case, the Court held that upon default being proven the court should accede to an application for a court-appointed receiver except in rare circumstances where a mortgagor or subsequent charge holder can show compelling commercial or other reason why such an order ought not to be made. The onus will always be on the mortgagor or subsequent charge holder in that regard.

27 In *United Saving*, the first mortgagee applied to appoint a receiver of commercial property being operated as a hotel. There was a mortgage on the land only and no security instrument expressly authorizing the appointment of a receiver of the hotel business. The application was opposed by a second mortgagee. The judgment does not expressly describe the equity in the property but the court found it unlikely that the owner had remaining equity to protect. There were significant unpaid taxes and only some rents were being collected by the second mortgagee under an assignment. The balance of the rents were either not being paid or were being paid to the owners. There was no evidence that any rents were being expended for the benefit of the property or for the benefit of anyone with equity in the property. There was evidence of "a very real danger"

that the property would be subject to a cease and desist order from the City and there had been a number of judgments registered against the property.

28 The Court was of the view the English line of authorities, of which in *Player v. Crompton & Co.*, [1914] 1 Ch. 954 (Eng. Ch. Div.); *Truman & Co. v. Redgrave* (1881), 18 Ch. 547 (Eng. Ch. Div.); and *Pratchett v. Drew*, [1924] 1 Ch. 280 (Eng. Ch. Div.) were said to be representative, were consistent in stating that a receiver will be appointed as a matter of course or a “mere matter of course” once default under a mortgage is established. Those authorities were said to have been adopted and followed in British Columbia in *Eaton Bay Trust Co. v. Motherlode Developments Ltd.* (1984), 50 B.C.L.R. 149, 50 C.B.R. (N.S.) 247 (B.C. S.C.); and *Royal Trust Corp. of Canada v. Exeter Properties Ltd.*, [1985] B.C.J. No. 942 (B.C. S.C. [In Chambers]), where receivers were appointed without proof of jeopardy.

29 Mr. Justice Burnyeat expressed the view that the decision of Huddart J.(as she then was) in *Korion Investments Corp. v. Vancouver Trade Mart Inc.*, [1993] B.C.J. No. 2352 (B.C. S.C. [In Chambers]), discussed below, to the effect that a receiver should not be appointed as a matter of course, should be limited to its facts. He observed that the long-established English practice did not appear to have been brought to the attention of the Court in *Korion* and there appear to have been very good reasons in the *Korion* case why the appointment of a receiver should not have been made.

30 Mr. Justice Burnyeat held, at paras. 15-17:

In accordance with the English decisions and the decisions in *Motherlode* and *Exeter*, I am satisfied that, unless the mortgagor or charge holder can show that extraordinary circumstances are present, the appointment of a Receiver or Receiver Manager at the instigation of a foreclosing mortgagee should be made as a matter of course if the mortgagee can show default under the mortgage.

The Court should not force a mortgagee to become a mortgagee in possession in order to exercise the rights of possession available to it under the mortgage. As well, where the mortgagor has provided an express covenant agreeing to the appointment of a Receiver or a Receiver Manager in the event of default, the Court should not ordinarily interfere with the contract between the parties. Also, it would be inappropriate for the Court to countenance a situation where default in payments continues while the mortgagor or some subsequent mortgagee has the benefit of the income which is available from a property charged by a mortgage ranking in priority ahead of the interests of those having the benefit of the income.

A mortgagee is entitled to the appointment of a Receiver or Receiver Manager as a matter of course when the mortgage is in default. The Court should only exercise its discretion not to make such an appointment in those rare occasions where a mortgagor or subsequent charge holder can show compelling commercial or other reason why such an order ought not to be made. The onus will always be on the mortgagor or subsequent charge holder in that regard.

31 The British Columbia cases referred to in *United Saving* are not unambiguous in their adoption of the rule that a receiver should be appointed as a matter of course. In *Eaton Bay Trust*, the Court noted, at p. 151:

In practice the appointment of a receiver in a mortgage proceeding is frequently made without proof of jeopardy (*Kerr on Receivers*, 15th ed. (1978), pp. 6, 30; *Re Crompton & Co.*, *Player v. Crompton & Co.*, [1914] 1 Ch. 954).

32 The Court did, however, express some reservations with respect to the adequacy of the material and the order appears to have been granted principally because it was unopposed, all parties having been served.

33 As Taylor J. noted in *Royal Bank v. Cal Glass Ltd.* (1978), 94 D.L.R. (3d) 84 (B.C. S.C.) at p. 351 [*Cal Glass*]: “While receivers are appointed in some types of action almost as a matter of course, this may largely be due to the fact that other parties do not object.” In that case, the order appointing a receiver/manager on a debenture was not granted. There was opposition and the applicant did not discharge the onus of establishing the justice and convenience of a court appointment, having already instrument-appointed a receiver.

34 The defendants say that the decision in the *United Saving* should not be followed, or should be closely restricted to its facts. They say the requirement in the *Law and Equity Act* that appointment be just and convenient is inconsistent with any presumption and no order should be made “as a matter of course”. The defendants say that other remedies short of receivership should first be considered: [*Cal Glass*; *Eaton Bay Trust*; *Royal Trust Corp.*; *Korion*; *Maple Trade Finance Inc. v. CY Oriental Holdings Ltd.*, 2009 BCSC 1527 (B.C. S.C. [In Chambers]); *Paragon Capital Corp. v. Merchants & Traders Assurance Co.*, 2002 ABQB 430, 46 C.B.R. (4th) 95 (Alta. Q.B.); and *BG International Ltd. v. Canadian Superior Energy Inc.*, 2009 ABCA 127, 53 C.B.R. (5th) 161 (Alta. C.A.).

35 As noted above, *Eaton Bay Trust* dismisses the requirement that there be jeopardy before the appointment but does place significant weight upon the exercise of the court’s discretion in granting the order. [*Cal Glass* is of little assistance to the defendants as the principal issue in that case was whether the court should come to the assistance of a bank with an instrument-appointed receiver where the respondent did not seek the discharge of the receiver, but simply sought to have the receiver continue to act at his peril. The issue before me is more clearly and explicitly addressed in *Korion* and *Maple Trade Finance*.

36 In *Korion*, the application for a court-appointed receiver was brought by a second mortgagee after judgment. The circumstances of the case were somewhat unusual in that there was apparently sufficient equity in the property to protect the applicant’s interests. The mortgagor’s property had an assessed market value of \$13,600,000. The first mortgage securing a debt of \$3,000,000 was in good standing. *Korion*’s judgment was for \$908,053.53. It had the right to appoint a receiver by instrument but, as in the case at bar, sought a court-appointed receiver-manager to avoid conflict. On its application, *Korion* did not adduce evidence to support its submission that the appointment of a receiver-manager was necessary or desirable. Rather, it simply asserted its right to enjoy the profits from its property. The Court held at paras. 7-8:

... In *AcmeTrack Ltd. v. Nor East Industries Ltd.*, (1983), 62 N.S.R. (2d) 358, Nathanson J. held that an affidavit supporting an application to appoint a receiver must state facts from which the court may draw a conclusion as to the necessity or advisability of appointing a receiver. I agree.

Courts have appointed post-judgment receivers for two main purposes: (i) to enable persons who possess rights over property to obtain the benefit of those rights where ordinary legal remedies are defective: *Sign-O-Lite Plastics Ltd. v. MacDonald Drugs (Cranbrook) Ltd.* (1980), 24 B.C.L.R. 172 at 174 (S.C.) and *Graybriar Industries Ltd. v. South West Marine Estates Ltd.* (1988), 21 B.C.L.R. 256 at 258 (S.C.); and (ii) to preserve property from some danger which threatens it: *Kerr on Receivers*, 17th ed. 1989, at 5-6 and 116; *N.E.C. Corp. v. Steintron International Electronics Ltd.* (1985), 67 B.C.L.R. 191 at 194-195; *HMW-Bennett & Wright Contractors Ltd. v. BMV Investments Ltd.* (1991), 7 C.B.R. (3d) 216 at 224 (Sask. Q.B.); *Canadian Commercial Bank v. Gemcraft Ltd.* (1985), 3 C.P.C. (2d) 13 at 14 (Ont. S.C.) and *First Investors Corp Ltd. v. 237208 Alta. Ltd.* (1982), 20 Sask. R. 335 at 341 (Q.B.).

37 The Court held there was no evidence that “ordinary legal remedies” were insufficient to preserve the property pending realization and there was no threat or danger to the property.

38 The Court considered the applicant's argument that in cases where the appointment is made under a statutory provision "the appointment is made as a matter of course as soon as the applicant's right is established, and it is unnecessary to allege any danger to the property; for the appointment of a receiver is necessary to enable the applicant to obtain that to which he is entitled." Huddart J. dismissed that proposition at para. 12:

I have some difficulty with the proposition that the appointment of a receiver after the order nisi will usually be appropriate. The appointment by a court of a receiver and particularly of a receiver-manager says to the world, including potential investors, that the mortgagor is not reliable, not capable of managing its affairs, not only in the opinion of the mortgagee, but also in the opinion of the court. That is a large presumption for a court to make when it is considering whether need or convenience or fairness dictates an equitable remedy even if the contract at issue permits such an appointment by instrument.

39 The Court accepted the respondent's submission that the appointment of a receiver would jeopardize its operations and attempts to obtain refinancing. Significantly, the respondent was paying the applicant the full amount of monthly interest accruing on its loan and proposed to continue doing so. On weighing the evidence, the Court exercised its discretion against granting the order sought.

40 In *Maple Trade Finance*, the plaintiff sought an order for the appointment of a receiver and manager following default by the defendant on a loan upon which the outstanding balance was \$5.7 million. The defendant did not dispute the default. It was prepared to make payments of \$4 million in instalments and to have the dispute with respect to the interest payable on the loan dealt with as a discreet issue.

41 The defendant had executed a general security agreement in favour of the plaintiff granting security over all of the defendant's present and after-acquired property. The general security agreement provided for the appointment of a receiver or application for court-appointed receiver in the event of default. Although the authorities cited to the Court are not referred to in the oral reasons for judgment of Masuhara J. (therefore there is no explicit consideration of *United Saving*), the Court does note that the applicant relied upon authorities to the effect that it ought not ordinarily interfere with an express covenant agreeing to the appointment of a receiver in the event of default. Further, the applicant submitted:

42 The parties had agreed the plaintiff may seek the appointment of a receiver in the event of a default;

43 The defendant owed a significant sum of money;

44 There appeared not to be a dispute with the fact of the size of the indebtedness;

45 The defendant was in default;

46 The resignation of the defendant's board and its recent delisting from the TSX exchange evidenced a need to ensure that the defendant's assets are preserved for the plaintiff's benefit;

47 There were concerns with respect to the financial statements of the defendant; and

48 The defendant did not indicate what steps were being taken to address the prospects for early repayment of the defendant's indebtedness.

49 The respondent proposed to pay all the outstanding principal of the debt in four equal monthly instalments over a short period and consented to the immediate appointment of a receiver in the event of default in making such payments. The position of the defendant was that there was no evidence of jeopardy to the plaintiff's security.

50 Mr. Justice Masuhara held:

There are a number of factors that figure in the determination of whether it is appropriate to appoint a receiver. In *Bennett on Receivership*, 2d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1999), at p. 130, a list of such factors is set out as follows:

- a) whether irreparable harm might be caused if no order were made, although it is not essential for a creditor to establish irreparable harm if a receiver is not appointed, particularly where the appointment of a receiver is authorized by the security documentation;
- b) the risk to the security holder taking into consideration the size of the debtor's equity in the assets and the need for protection or safeguarding of the assets while litigation takes place;
- c) the nature of the property;
- d) the apprehended or actual waste of the debtor's assets;
- e) the preservation and protection of the property pending judicial resolution;
- f) the balance of convenience to the parties;
- g) the fact that the creditor has the right to appoint a receiver under the documentation provided for the loan;
- h) the enforcement of rights under a security instrument where the security-holder encounters or expects to encounter difficulty with the debtor and others;
- i) the principle that the appointment of a receiver is extraordinary relief which should be granted cautiously and sparingly;
- j) the consideration of whether a court appointment is necessary to enable the receiver to carry out its' duties more efficiently;
- k) the effect of the order upon the parties;
- l) the conduct of the parties;

- m) the length of time that a receiver may be in place;
- n) the cost to the parties;
- o) the likelihood of maximizing return to the parties;
- p) the goal of facilitating the duties of the receiver.

51 Weighing these factors, Masuhara J. dismissed the application for the appointment of a receiver. The Court enjoined the defendant from disposing of assets, ordered the defendant repay the principal and non-default interest on a schedule, to provide financial statements to the plaintiff and to deliver certain shares as security for the debt. Upon default in payment, a receiver would immediately be appointed on the terms of the application. Leave was given to renew the application for appointment of a receiver in the event of any material adverse change in circumstances.

52 The criteria described in *Bennett on Receivership*, 2d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1999) ("Bennett") set out by Masuhara J. have been applied in Alberta subsequent to the decision in *Citibank Canada* to which Burnyeat J. referred in *United Saving*. In *Paragon*, the Court of Queen's Bench considered an appeal from an *ex parte* order appointing a receiver. Upon concluding that the *ex parte* order ought not to have been issued the Court went on to consider the appointment of a receiver *de novo*. At para. 27 the Court outlined the factors that may be considered on an application (those set out in Bennett) and then added, at paras. 28 and 31:

In cases where the security documentation provides for the appointment of a receiver, which is the case here with respect to the General Security Agreement and the Extension Agreement, the extraordinary nature of the remedy sought is less essential to the inquiry: *Bank of Nova Scotia v. Freure Village on Clair Creek*, [1996] O.J. No. 5088 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]), paragraph 12.

.....

The balance of convenience in these circumstances rests with *Paragon*, which is owed nearly \$3 million. There is no plan to repay any of this indebtedness, and no persuasive evidence that the appointment would cause undue hardship to the defendants. As stated by Ground J. in *Swiss Bank Corp. (Canada) v. Odyssey Industries Inc.*, [1995] O.J. No. 144 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) at paragraph 31, the appointment of a receiver always causes some hardship to a debtor who loses control of its assets and risks their sale. Undue hardship that would prevent the appointment of a receiver must be more than this usual unfortunate consequence. Here, any proposed sale of an asset by the receiver must be brought before the court for approval and its propriety and necessity will be fully canvassed on its merits.

53 The Alberta Court of Appeal has more recently applied the criteria described in Bennett and commented on the extent to which there should be consideration of the hardship arising from the appointment of a receiver. In *BG International*, at para. 17, the Court held:

[T]he chambers judge must carefully balance the rights of both the applicant and the respondent. The mere appointment of a receiver can have devastating effects. The respondent referred us to the statement in *Swiss Bank Corp. (Canada) v. Odyssey Industries Inc.* (1995), 30 C.B.R. (3d) 49 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) at para. 31:

... With respect to the hardship to Odyssey and Weston should a receiver be appointed, I am unable to find any evidence of undue or extreme hardship. Obviously the appointment of a receiver always causes hardship to the debtor in that the debtor loses control of its assets and business and may risk having its assets and business sold. The situation in this case is no different.

This quotation does not reflect the law of Alberta. Under the *Judicature Act*, it must be “just and convenient” to grant a receivership order. Justice and convenience can only be established by considering and balancing the position of both parties. The onus is on the applicant. The respondent does not have to prove any special hardship, much less “undue hardship” to resist such an application. The effect of the mere granting of the receivership order must always be considered, and if possible a remedy short of receivership should be used.

54 In restating the rule that the onus rests upon the applicant in every case to discharge the burden of establishing that the balance of convenience favours the appointment of a receiver, the Alberta Court of Appeal appears now to have rejected the presumption described by McDonald J. in *Citibank Canada*.

55 In light of these authorities, I conclude that the statutory requirement that the appointment of a receiver be just and convenient does not permit or require me to begin my assessment of the material with the presumption that the plaintiff is entitled to a court-appointed receiver unless the defendant can demonstrate a compelling commercial or other reason why the order should not be made. Of the considered judgments on the issue from this Court, I prefer the approach taken by Masuhara J. in *Maple Trade Finance*. That approach permits the court, when it is appropriate to do so, to place considerable weight upon the fact that the creditor has the right to instrument-appoint a receiver. It also permits the court to engage in that analysis described by Taylor J. in *[Cal Glass]* when considering whether the applicant has established that it is appropriate and necessary for the court to lend its aid to a party who may appoint a receiver without a court order.

Order for Sale Before Judgment

56 Section 15 of *The Law and Equity Act* describes the jurisdiction to grant an order for sale before judgment:

15 The court may, before or after judgment in a proceeding

(a) by a mortgagee, for the foreclosure of the equity of redemption in mortgaged property, or

(b) by a vendor of land, where a claim for the cancellation of the agreement is made, with or without a claim for the forfeiture of money paid on account of the purchase price,

on the application of a person who has an interest in the property or land, direct a sale of the property or land on the terms the court considers just.

57 A party foreclosing on a mortgage must afford the borrower an opportunity to redeem the property in all but exceptional circumstances. In *Bank of Nova Scotia v. Mrazek* (1985), 64 B.C.L.R. 282 (B.C. C.A.), the Court considered an appeal from an order granting the foreclosing bank immediate and exclusive right to sell a mortgagor's property, with the proviso that the order would not be entered for one month and the mortgagor would have the right to redeem the property prior to court approval of the sale. The Court, referring to *Devany v. Brackpool* (1981), 31 B.C.L.R. 256 (B.C. S.C. [In Chambers]) and *Canlan Investment Corp. v. Gibbons* (1983), 42 B.C.L.R. 199 (B.C. S.C.), held that the law is clear that an immediate order for sale or an immediate order absolute can only be made on proof by the mortgagee of exceptional circumstances, because the mortgagor loses the right to redeem and is personally liable for the shortfall, if any, on the sale. The court will look to the amount of the shortfall, whether the asset is wasting and whether the market is worsening, among other factors, in determining whether the circumstances are exceptional.

58 In *Devany*, the petitioners sought an immediate order for sale without having obtained judgment or an order *nisi* of foreclosure. They took the position that the *Rules of Court* permit an application for sale of secured property before or after judgment. In response to the concern that the respondents would lose their right to redeem, the petitioners took the position that the respondents could seek an order permitting them to redeem the property at the hearing of the application to approve the sale. Mr. Justice Taylor said the following at p. 258 in describing the applicant's position:

That would, of course, tend to defeat a fundamental rule of law which has become very well established in England and in this province in proceedings for the realization of mortgage security. The equitable principle on which the courts have long proceeded is that a mortgagor in default shall not lose his land without first having a clear opportunity to redeem.

59 With respect to the suggestion that redemption be considered at the application to approve a sale, Taylor J. held (at p. 259): "I think it would leave the mortgagors in a state of uncertainty as to how and when they may redeem which significantly impairs their equity of redemption." Assuming, for the purposes of argument, that an order for sale could be granted before an order *nisi* of foreclosure, he held:

But I am satisfied that the granting of an order for sale at that stage would be as much a matter of discretion as the granting of an order for sale after decree nisi and I do not accept the proposition that a mortgagee who thus obtained an order for sale in lieu of a decree nisi would be relieved of the normal obligation to account and the setting of a period within which the mortgagor may redeem.

60 The court could only contemplate departure from the normal requirements to account for the amount which must be paid and establish an appropriate redemption period - where the applicant could establish a "very special reason" for doing so.

61 The right to redeem is inconsistent with the granting of an order for sale to the mortgagee: *Canlan*, citing *Pope v. Roberts* (1979), 10 B.C.L.R. 50 (B.C. C.A.) and *First Western Capital Ltd. v. Wardle*, [1982] B.C.J. No. 770 (B.C. S.C.).

62 In *Canlan*, the petitioner had not brought a foreclosure petition on for hearing but applied for and obtained an order declaring a mortgage to be in default and an order for sale. An application came on before Van Der Hoop L.J.S.C. for approval of the sale. The court held:

In this file, the order for sale was sought and obtained against principle and authority. At the time the order was given no accounting was made and no time for redemption fixed, no judgment had been given on the personal covenant, and there was no evidence that the security of the applicant was in jeopardy.

63 That being the general rule in foreclosure actions, the question before me is whether the receiver of a business ought to be empowered to sell the real property of that business without affording the debtor an opportunity to redeem. The plaintiff says the receiver acquires the full range of powers to acquire and dispose of assets formerly enjoyed by the debtor, including the power to sell real estate in the ordinary course of business in order to discharge corporate debt.

64 The defendants say that the power to appoint a receiver is a remedy commonly afforded by security instruments and, at least where the debtor's principal asset is real estate, the lender cannot be permitted to use the power to appoint a receiver as

a means of avoiding the usual redemption period.

65 There is the further question, in this case, whether that power ought to be granted to the receiver before judgment. The defendants say that neither the plaintiff nor a receiver should be entitled to offer the property for sale until after the plaintiff has been granted judgment and a redemption period has expired. In support of this proposition, the defendant relies on *South West Marine Estates Ltd. v. Bank of British Columbia* (1985), 65 B.C.L.R. 328 (B.C. C.A.) at para. 21; *Royal Bank v. Astor Hotel Ltd.* (1986), 3 B.C.L.R. (2d) 252, 62 C.B.R. (N.S.) 257 (B.C. C.A.) [*Astor Hotel*], at para. 47; and *First Pacific Credit Union v. Grimwood Sports Inc.* (1984), 16 D.L.R. (4th) 181, 59 B.C.L.R. 145 (B.C. C.A.).

66 There appears to be no doubt that if a party seeks a court-appointed receiver, the powers to be granted to the receiver are in the discretion of the court regardless of the broad powers which the parties might have consented to grant the receiver by contract. Bennett notes, at p. 244: "The court has the discretion to grant the receiver the power of sale even though the security instrument contains a power of sale." The author there expresses the view that the security holder should justify to the court as to why a power of sale is required. At p. 244 he notes: "In fact the receiver should have no authority to sell the debtor's assets out of the ordinary course of business until the security holder obtains judgment against the debtor".

67 At p. 234:

While the court has the power to authorize a sale at any time, the security holder should have judgment against the debtor before the court authorizes a sale of the debtor's business, especially where real estate is involved. In real estate matters, the debtor would normally be entitled to a redemption period.

68 Further, Bennett notes at p. 245:

In the case of real property the court generally protects the debtor's equity of redemption for a period of time before it authorizes a sale. Where there are no meritorious defences, the security holder should obtain judgment first and then give the debtor an opportunity to redeem before the assets are sold.

69 In support of that proposition, Bennett cites the cases to which I have been referred to by the defendant: *First Pacific; Vista Homes Ltd. v. Taplow Financial Ltd.* (1985), 64 B.C.L.R. 291, 56 C.B.R. (N.S.) 225 (B.C. S.C.); and *Astor Hotel*.

70 In *First Pacific*, Esson J.A. describes the appropriate role of a receiver appointed under a debenture. He considers the application for sale at p. 153:

What seems often to be lost sight of is that there is no necessary connection between the appointment of a receiver-manager and the remedy of a sale; and that it is the plaintiff, i.e. the debenture holder, not the receiver manager who seeks the remedy. It is the plaintiff who has the right and opportunity to prosecute the action and it is the plaintiff who, if judgment is granted in his favour, is given the remedy of sale. The order for sale before judgment is an extraordinary remedy which should be granted only in special circumstances.

71 At p. 154 he added:

In many cases, orders have been made giving to the receiver-manager at the outset power to offer assets for sale subject to court approval. The power to make such an order as a matter of course is, in my view, doubtful. There is power to make such an order in an application expressly raising the issue whether there should be a sale before judgment. Such a power is given by Rule 43(2) upon a finding by the court that “there eventually must be a sale”. The power under s. 16 of the *Law and Equity Act* to order a sale before judgment may apply in some debenture holders’ actions. There may be other sources of jurisdiction but I know of none that authorizes an order for sale before judgment as a matter of course.

72 In *Vista Homes*, McLachlin J. (as she then was), considered an application brought by a court-appointed receiver with a power to sell assets for an order for conduct of sale of a property held in joint tenancy by the debtor and another company. The application was dismissed as premature. The court held at p. 294:

The creditor at whose instance the receiver manager was appointed is not entitled to realize on the debt which it alleges to be owing before judgment by having the receiver manager sell the alleged debtor’s property. It follows that there should not be a sale before judgment unless special circumstances are made out: *First Pac. Credit Union*

[citation omitted].

73 In *Astor Hotel*, the Court appointed a receiver under a debenture on September 18, 1985 and granted the receiver exclusive conduct of sale effective November 10, 1985. On the application for leave to appeal that order it was argued that the order for conduct of sale should not have been made without an accounting of the debt and a redemption period. The application for leave was dismissed on the basis that the chambers judge, by delaying the power of sale for two months had implicitly recognized and afforded to the debtor a redemption period. Taggart J.A. cited, apparently with approval *First Pacific*, *Vista Homes*, *Bank of Montreal v. Appcon Ltd.* (1981), 33 O.R. (2d) 97, 123 D.L.R. (3d) 394 (Ont. H.C.); *Royal Bank v. Camex Canada Corp.* (1985), 63 B.C.L.R. 125 (B.C. S.C.); and *South West Marine Estates Ltd. v. Bank of British Columbia* (1985), 65 B.C.L.R. 328 (B.C. C.A.). The latter two cases were cited as authority for the proposition that “the trend is to treat the issues arising in mortgage foreclosure proceedings and in debenture holders’ actions in similar ways”.

74 In considering the plaintiff’s application I bear in mind that there may be advantages to all parties in giving a receiver the conduct of sale of real property. Among those are the factors considered in by Burnyeat J. in *United Saving*, at paras. 32-34, in granting the receiver power to offer the hotel for sale in that case.

Discussion

Appointment of a Receiver

75 The parties in this case stipulated in their contracts that the plaintiff would be entitled to appoint a receiver or to apply for a court-appointed receiver in the event of default. The relief sought by the plaintiff is not, therefore, extraordinary.

76 The defendants owe a significant sum of money to the plaintiff and have not reduced the principal debt since inception of the loan. There does not appear to be a dispute with respect to the amount of the debt. Nor does there appear to be a dispute that the defendants are in default.

77 There is no imminent prospect of repayment of principal from operations. There is some evidence of refinancing efforts but there is no suggestion that those efforts will lead to repayment of even the principal loan in its entirety.

78 There has not been full disclosure of the defendants' refinancing plans. The plaintiff has not been involved in refinancing efforts and has not received particulars of the proposed plan.

79 The interim plan to make partial payments to the plaintiff will not indemnify the plaintiff against interest accumulating on the principal and arrears in the interim.

80 If payments are to come from operating revenues, the defendants estimates of those revenues are optimistic and there is no assurance that those interim payments can be made.

81 In the case at bar, unlike *Korion* and *Maple Trade Finance*, there is a real risk to the plaintiff's equity and real doubt with respect to the prospect of recovery of principal. The defendants' plans do not provide for indemnity to the plaintiff for the losses incurred on an ongoing basis. There is inadequate provision to minimize the irreparable losses that will be incurred by the lender.

82 The defendants say that it would not be just and equitable to appoint a receiver in the circumstances of this case. The defendants say that the overriding consideration for the court is the protection and preservation of the property pending judgment and that operation of the hotel by experienced managers will minimize interim losses and maximize the potential sale value. They say they can most effectively market the property while operating it without any risk or further jeopardy to the plaintiff. The defendants say the appointment of a receiver will be detrimental to all parties.

83 The defendants further say appointment of a receiver will so damage the hotel's reputation that its value will be substantially affected. There is, however, no persuasive evidence that the appointment would cause undue hardship to the defendants. I conclude, as did the Court in *Royal Trust Corp.*, that it would be naive to think that those with whom the defendants do business would be unaware of the foreclosure proceedings presently underway.

84 The defendants seek to have the reins of the debtor company while the risk of profit and loss in the interim remains almost entirely in the hands of the plaintiff. The liability of the guarantors is limited. While there does not appear to be any basis to conclude that the asset will be wasted, the budget does call for management fees to be paid by the defendant to related companies owned by the Pomeroy Group. The Pomeroy Group operates other hotels and businesses. There is some risk to the plaintiff in permitting the defendants to manage the operations of the Hotel when it may be in the defendants' interests to earn their profits elsewhere. The Plaintiff is suffering losses in the interim. I am of the view that it should not be required to leave its interests in the hands of the defendants.

85 Balancing the rights of the parties I find it is just and convenient to grant a receivership order.

Order for Sale

86 The plaintiff does not seek an order permitting the receiver to receive to sell the real property without court approval but, rather seeks the conduct of sale, subject to court approval. The order sought by the plaintiff would require court approval of transactions with a value in excess of \$200,000 and aggregate transactions in excess of \$500,000. As conduct of sale precludes redemption, the order sought by the plaintiff is inconsistent with affording the defendants a redemption period.

87 The defendant says that it is in the best position to refinance or market the Hotel and that there is no reason why it should not be afforded the usual redemption period when the plaintiff has not obtained judgment.

88 It is acknowledged that business operations of the Hotel will generate insufficient revenue to permit Chetwynd and NHLP to pay interest as it accrues on the loan. The defendants will certainly make no headway in repaying the arrears that have accumulated to date. The plaintiff says there is no reasonable prospect that refinancing will make the plaintiff whole. It seeks to protect its interest by selling the assets that are the subject of the security.

89 I cannot find on the evidence that such special circumstances exist that the plaintiff should have an order for sale before judgment and consideration of an appropriate redemption period. It is not clear that the value of the security is diminishing. To the contrary there is some evidence that the profitability and therefore the value of the Hotel is likely to increase in the interim. Some net income is being generated from operations. The order appointing the receiver shall not therefore authorize the receiver to have conduct of the sale of the Hotel. The receiver will be authorized to engage only in such sales as would occur in the ordinary course of business of the Hotel.

90 The plaintiff shall have leave to renew the application for conduct of sale in the event of a material change in circumstances, in the event the receiver discovers a financial situation substantially different from that known to the plaintiff on this application or on obtaining judgment.

91 The form of the order appointing the receiver, subject to the limitation set out in these reasons, will be in the form provided to the Court by the plaintiff on the application.

92 The parties have leave to apply for further directions if necessary.

Application granted in part.

6

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RECEIVERSHIPS

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Third Edition

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Once an order is made appointing a receiver, the court may refer the conduct of all or part of the receivership to a referee under Rule 54 of the Ontario *Rules of Civil Procedure*.⁵¹

(b) Under What Circumstances—Who May Apply

In determining whether it is “just or convenient” that a receiver should be appointed, the court considers many factors that vary in the circumstances of the case. While the remedy is usually employed by a security holder to enforce payment of a debt, other parties can employ the remedy seeking protection and preservation of assets pending adjudication of the issues. These factors include the following:⁵²

in an appointment of a receiver: see *B.C. Power Corp v. A.G. (B.C.)* (1962), 38 W.W.R. 577 at p. 588 and p. 635 ff, 34 D.L.R. (2d) 196 at p. 211, 1962 CarswellBC 71 (B.C. C.A.), appeal allowed (sub nom. *B.C. Power Corp. v. B.C. Electric Co.*) [1962] S.C.R. 642, 38 W.W.R. 701, 34 D.L.R. (2d) 196 at p. 274 (S.C.C.).

See also *McKnight v. Hutchison*, 2011 BCSC 36 (CanLII), 2011 CarswellBC 41 (B.C. S.C.) where the court did not appoint a receiver in a partnership dispute, but made a preservation order pending the trial.

- 51 Once a court-appointed receiver is appointed, it is doubted that the security holder can simply discontinue the action especially after the court has ordered a sale. Although the appointment of a receiver is corollary relief in an action, the receiver cannot be discharged except by the court which appointed it: see *Guar. Trust Co. of Canada v. 208633 Holdings Ltd.*; *Northland Bank v. 208633 Holdings Ltd.* (1982), 19 Alta. L.R. (2d) 151, 42 C.B.R. (N.S.) 90, 1982 CarswellAlta 312 (Alta. Q.B.).
- 52 These factors were considered in *Paragon Capital Corp. v. Merchants & Traders Assurance Co.* (2002), 46 C.B.R. (4th) 95, 2002 ABQB 430 (CanLII), 2002 CarswellAlta 1531 (Alta. Q.B.) and in *Maple Trade Finance Inc. v. CY Oriental Holdings Ltd.* (2009), 60 C.B.R. (5th) 142, 2009 BCSC 1527 (CanLII), 2009 CarswellBC 2982 (B.C. S.C. [In Chambers]).

In *1468121 Ontario Ltd. v. 663789 Ontario Ltd.*, 2008 CanLII 66137, 2008 CarswellOnt 7601 (Ont. S.C.J.) at para. 9, leave to appeal to the Divisional Court dismissed 2009 CanLII 9440, 2009 CarswellOnt 1128 (Ont. S.C.J.) where the court considered the four following factors in dismissing a motion for the appointment of an interim receiver:

- “(1) Since the appointment of a receiver is very intrusive, it should only be used sparingly with due consideration for the effect on the parties as well as a consideration of conduct of the parties. (See: *Royal Bank v. Chongsim Investments Ltd.* (1997), 32 O.R. (3d) 565 (Ont. Gen. Div.));
- (2) Since an appointment of a receiver is tantamount to execution before judgment, it should not be granted unless there is strong evidence that the creditor will not recover. (See: *Ryder Truck Rental Canada Ltd. v. 568907 Ontario Ltd. (Trustee of)* (1987), 16 C.P.C. (2d) 130 (Ont. H.C.));
- (3) When the security interest permits the appointment of a receiver – and the circumstances of default justify the appointment – the extraordinary nature of the remedy is less essential to the consideration of the court. (See *Bank of Nova Scotia v. Freure Village on Clair Creek*, 1996 CarswellOnt 2328 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]));
- (4) Where there is default which is not caused by the moving party where a loan had matured and there was no other means to protect the party’s interest, then a receivership order should issue. (See *Royal Bank v. 605298 Ontario Inc.*, 1998 CarswellOnt 4436 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List])).”

In *Lindsey Estate v. Strategic Metals Corp.* (2010), 67 C.B.R. (5th) 88, 2010 ABQB 242 (CanLII), 2010 CarswellAlta 641 (Alta. Q.B.), appeal dismissed (2010), 27 Alta. L.R. (5th) 241, 69 C.B.R. (5th) 42, 2010 ABCA 191 (CanLII) (Alta. C.A.), the motion court considered the following factors in

- (1) whether irreparable harm might be caused if no order were made, although it is not essential that the creditor establish that it will suffer irreparable harm if a receiver is not appointed;⁵³
- (2) the risk to the security holder. In considering the risk factor, the court considers the size of the debtor's equity in the assets and the need for protection or safeguarding the assets while the litigation takes place. If the security holder can readily establish that there is going to be a sizeable deficiency in relation to the size of the loan, then the court will lean in favour of making the appointment as there is clear prejudice to the security holder. On the other hand, the court may not consider this factor to be important if there is no danger or jeopardy to the security holder or in other words, there is a substantial equity that will adequately protect the security holder;⁵⁴
- (3) the nature of the property;

determining "just or convenient":

"In determining whether it is just and convenient to appoint a Receiver, a Court should consider various factors such as:

- a. whether irreparable harm might be caused if no order is made;
- b. the risk to the parties;
- c. the risk of waste debtor's assets;
- d. the preservation and protection of property pending judicial resolution; and
- e. the balance of convenience."

See also *Textron Financial Canada Ltd. v. Chetwynd Motels Ltd.* (2010), 67 C.B.R. (5th) 97, 2010 BCSC 477 (CanLII), 2010 CarswellBC 855 (B.C. S.C. [In Chambers]).

- 53 *Swiss Bank Corp. (Canada) v. Odyssey Industries Inc.* (1995), 30 C.B.R. (3d) 49, 1995 CarswellOnt 39 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) referring to *Bank of Montreal v. Appcon Ltd.* (1981), 33 O.R. (2d) 97, 37 C.B.R. (N.S.) 281, 123 D.L.R. (3d) 394 (Ont. H.C.). In the *Odyssey* case, there was no evidence of the loans being in jeopardy of repayment while being in default.

The *Swiss Bank* case has been distinguished and not followed in Alberta: *BG International Ltd. v. Canadian Superior Energy Inc.* (2009), 53 C.B.R. (5th) 161, 2009 ABCA 127 (CanLII), 2009 CarswellAlta 469 (Alta. C.A.) where the court stated that the debtor does not to prove any special hardship, much less "undue hardship" to resist an application for the appointment of a receiver.

See also *Lakeside Colony of Hutterian Brethren v. Hofer* (1993), 87 Man. R. (2d) 216, 19 C.B.R. (3d) 190, 1993 CarswellMan 30 (Man. Q.B.) where the court also took into consideration the fact that the plaintiffs had a strong *prima facie* case and that the balance of convenience favoured the appointment.

- 54 If there is no danger to the debtor's property, and the appointment will have a devastating effect on the debtor, the court will not appoint a receiver: *HMW-Bennett & Wright Contractors Ltd. v. BWV Investments Ltd.* (1991), 95 Sask. R. 211, 7 C.B.R. (3d) 216, 1991 CarswellSask 42 (Sask. Q.B.)

See also *Ontario Development Corp. v. Ralph Nicholas Enterprises Ltd.* (1985), 57 C.B.R. (N.S.) 186, 1985 CarswellOnt 206 (Ont. H.C.) where the court, after considering that the debtor's financial situation was desperate, appointed a receiver and manager.

In *Churchill (Local Government District) v. Costa Cartage Ltd.* (1994), 94 Man. R. (2d) 216, 1994 CarswellMan 286 (Man. Q.B.) where the debtor threatened to remove the furniture and furnishings of a hotel.

See also *Wilson v. Marine Drive Properties Ltd.* (2008), 51 C.B.R. (5th) 74, 2008 BCSC 1431 (CanLII), 2008 CarswellBC 2240 (B.C. S.C.).

See also *Loblaws Brands Ltd. v. Thornton*, 2009 CanLII 12803, 2009 CarswellOnt 1588 (Ont. S.C.J.) where the unsecured creditor's right to recovery money in a fraud situation is in serious jeopardy.

- (4) the rights of the parties thereto;⁵⁵
- (5) the apprehended or actual waste of the debtor's assets;
- (6) the preservation and protection of the property pending the judicial resolution;⁵⁶
- (7) the balance of convenience to the parties;
- (8) the fact that the creditor has the right to appoint a receiver under its security;⁵⁷

55 *Nat. Trust Co. v. Yellowvest Holdings Ltd. et al.* (1979), 24 O.R. (2d) 11, 98 D.L.R. (3d) 189, 1979 CarswellOnt 1364 (Ont. H.C.); applied in *Third Generation Realty Ltd. v. Twigg Holdings Ltd.* (1991), 6 C.P.C. (3d) 366, 1991 CarswellOnt 469 (Ont. Gen. Div.). See also *Royal Trust Corp. of Can. v. D.Q. Plaza Holdings et al.* (1984), 36 Sask. R. 84, 53 C.B.R. (N.S.) 18, 1984 CarswellSask 38 (Sask. Q.B.).

See also *BG International Ltd. v. Canadian Superior Energy Inc.* (2009), 53 C.B.R. (5th) 161, 2009 ABCA 127 (CanLII), 2009 CarswellAlta 469 (Alta. C.A.) where the court stated that an appointment should not lightly be granted and that the rights of both parties should be carefully balanced before an appointment is made.

In *MTM Commercial Trust v. Statesman Riverside Quays Ltd.* (2010), 70 C.B.R. (5th) 233, 2010 ABQB 647 (CanLII) (Alta. Q.B.) the court reviewed the test for the appointment of a receiver as being comparable to the test for an injunction, namely whether there is a serious issue to be tried, irreparable harm if not granted, and the balance of convenience: *RJR MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General)* (1994), 111 D.L.R. (4th) 385, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 311, 1994 CarswellQue 120 (S.C.C.).

56 For example, the court has the discretion to appoint a receiver in a mortgage action where the mortgagor fails to manage the buildings properly and make repairs: *Alpha Investments & Agencies Ltd. v. Maritime Life Assurance Company* (1978), 23 N.B.R. (2d) 261, 1978 CarswellNB 96 (N.B. C.A.); *J. P. Capital Corp. (Trustee of) v. Perez* (1996), 38 C.B.R. (3d) 301, 1996 CarswellOnt 430 (Ont. Gen. Div.); *Farallon Investments Ltd. v. Bruce Pallet Fruit Farms Ltd.*, 1992 CarswellOnt 4933, 31 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1283 (Ont. Gen. Div.).

See also *McLennan Ross v. Paramount Life Ins. Co.* (1986), 44 Alta. L.R. (2d) 375, 63 C.B.R. (N.S.) 265, 1986 CarswellAlta 448 (Alta. Q.B.). When a mortgagee applies for a court appointment, the order does not create any new rights; it only protects existing rights. In this case, the court held that the receiver is entitled to collect rent arrears after the appointment, but the receiver cannot collect rent already collected by the mortgagor.

See also *Standard Trust Co. v. Pendencygrasse Hldg. Ltd.* (1988), 71 C.B.R. (N.S.) 65, 1988 CarswellSask 27 (Sask. Q.B.) where the court, in referring to many of these factors, refused the appointment on the basis that the mortgagee already had significant control over the management board of a condominium complex and, therefore, its security was not in danger.

See also *Confederation Life Insurance Co. v. Double Y Holdings Inc.*, [1991] O.J. No. 2613, 1991 CarswellOnt 1511 (Ont. Gen. Div.), where the court, in referring to many of these factors, appointed a receiver to complete a large construction project of an office building and to lease out space. Here, the debtor had no substantial equity in the project, its loans were in default and they had matured.

See also *Bank of N.S. v. Marbeck Well Servicing Ltd.; Bank of N.S. v. Becker* (1986), 43 Alta. L.R. (2d) 453 (M.C.) (headnote only).

See also *Yukon v. B.Y.G. Natural Resources Inc.* (2007), 31 C.B.R. (5th) 100, 2007 YKSC 2 (CanLII), 2007 CarswellYukon 1 (Y.T. S.C.) where the court concluded that an interim receiver was needed where there were dangerous and unsafe conditions in a mine site that had been abandoned.

If the property is not in peril or the creditor is unable to demonstrate that, the court will not appoint a receiver: *Tim v. Lai and Harry Invts. Ltd.* (1984), 53 C.B.R. (N.S.) 80, 1984 CarswellIBC 575, 1984 CanLII 446 (B.C. S.C.).

Instead of appointing a receiver, the security holder can request an injunction and a preservation order against the debtor pending a declaration that the security holder is entitled to enforce its security.

57 Where this clause is present, the extraordinary nature of the remedy is less essential as a determining factor: *Bank of Nova Scotia v. Freure Village on Clair Creek* (1996), 40 C.B.R. (3d) 274, 1996 CarswellOnt 2328, 1996 CanLII 8258 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]); *Maple Trade Finance Inc. v. CY Oriental Holdings Ltd.* (2009), 60 C.B.R. (5th) 142, 2009 BCSC 1527 (CanLII), 2009 CarswellIBC 2982 (B.C. S.C.); *Textron Financial Canada Ltd. v. Chetwynd Motels Ltd.* (2010), 67 C.B.R. (5th) 97, 2010 BCSC 477 (CanLII), 2010 CarswellIBC 855 (B.C. S.C. [In Chambers]).

- (9) the enforcement of rights under a security instrument where the security holder encounters or expects to encounter difficulty with the debtor and others;⁵⁸
- (10) that the appointment of a receiver is extraordinary relief which should be granted cautiously and sparingly;⁵⁹
- (11) whether a court appointment is necessary to enable a private receiver to carry out its duties more efficiently;⁶⁰
- (12) the effect of the order on the parties. If a receiver is appointed, its effect may be devastating upon the parties and their business and, where the business has to be sold, the appointment of a receiver may have a detrimental effect upon the price;⁶¹
- (13) the conduct of the parties;⁶²
- (14) the length of time that a receiver may be in place. Usually, a receiver appointed by the court remains in place until after judgment and realization of assets. This could last several years depending upon the nature of the business. However, where a claimant moves for an order appointing a receiver for a short

See also *Bank of Montreal v. Carnival National Leasing Ltd.*, 2011 CarswellOnt 896, 2011 ONSC 1007 (CanLII) (Ont. S.C.J.).

See also below in text (10) extraordinary relief.

See also *Confederation Trust Co. v. Dentbram Developments Ltd.*, [1992] O.J. No. 3870, 1992 CarswellOnt 474 (Ont. Gen. Div.).

- 58 *STN Labs Inc. v. Saffron Rouge Inc.* (2010), 68 C.B.R. (5th) 287, 2010 ONSC 3042 (CanLII), 2010 CarswellOnt 3588 (Ont. S.C.J.); *Uvalde Investment Co. v. 754223 Ontario Ltd.* (1997), 45 C.B.R. (3d) 315, 1997 CarswellOnt 365 (Ont. Gen. Div.).

- 59 *Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Jack*, 1990 CarswellOnt 3055, [1990] O.J. No. 670, 20 A.C.W.S. (3d) 416 (Ont. Gen. Div.) referring to *Fisher Investments Ltd. et al. v. Nusbaum* (1988), 71 C.B.R. (N.S.) 185, 1988 CarswellOnt 180 (Ont. H.C.). While the remedy is extraordinary, the fact that a creditor has the right to appoint a receiver by instrument under its security makes the “extraordinary” nature of the remedy less essential in the consideration: *Bank of Nova Scotia v. Freure Village on Clair Creek* (1996), 40 C.B.R. (3d) 274, 1996 CarswellOnt 2328, 1996 CanLII 8258 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]).

See also *Royal Bank of Canada v. Chongsim Investments Ltd.* (1997), 32 O.R. (3d) 565, 46 C.B.R. (3d) 267, 1997 CarswellOnt 988 (Ont. Gen. Div.).

See also *O.W. Waste Inc. v. EX-L Sweeping & Flushing Ltd.*, [2003] O.J. No. 3766, 2003 CanLII 34187, 2003 CarswellOnt 3598 (Ont. S.C.J.), appeal dismissed 2004 CarswellOnt 810 (Ont. C.A.); *WestLB AG, Toronto Branch v. Rosseau Resort Developments Inc.* (2009), 59 C.B.R. (5th) 303, 2009 CanLII 55120 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]).

- 60 *Bank of Nova Scotia v. Freure Village on Clair Creek* (1996), 40 C.B.R. (3d) 274, 1996 CanLII 8258 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]); referred to in *Textron Financial Canada Ltd. v. Beta Ltée/Beta Brands Ltd.* (2007), 27 C.B.R. (5th) 1, 2007 CanLII 297 (Ont. S.C.J.); and followed in *GE Commercial Distribution Finance Canada v. Sandy Cove Marine Co.*, 2011 ONSC 3851 (CanLII) (Ont. S.C.J.).

- 61 *Fisher Investments Ltd. et al. v. Nusbaum* (1988), 71 C.B.R. (N.S.) 185, 1988 CarswellOnt 180 (Ont. H.C.). In this case, the court was also concerned about the receiver’s capabilities as the proposed receiver lacked experience in operating a nursing home. See also *Royal Bank of Canada v. Chongsim Investments Ltd.* (1997), 32 O.R. (3d) 565, 46 C.B.R. (3d) 267, 1997 CarswellOnt 988 (Ont. Gen. Div.).

- 62 *Royal Bank of Canada v. Chongsim Investments Ltd.* (1997), 32 O.R. (3d) 565, 46 C.B.R. (3d) 267, 1997 CarswellOnt 988 (Ont. Gen. Div.) where the court in rejecting the appointment reviewed the effect of the order on the parties as well as their conduct.

- period, say six weeks; the court is reluctant to make such an appointment as it has devastating effects on the parties;⁶³
- (15) costs to the parties;
 - (16) the likelihood of maximizing the return to the parties;
 - (17) facilitating the duties of the receiver;⁶⁴ and
 - (18) the secured creditor's good faith, commercial reasonableness of the proposed appointment and any questions of equity.⁶⁵

In many cases, a security holder whose instrument charges all or substantially all of the debtor's property provides for a court-appointed receivership if the debtor is in default and fails to pay following a demand for payment.⁶⁶ *Prima facie*, the security holder is entitled to enforce its security by applying for a court-appointed receiver and manager.

If the creditor who applies for the appointment of a receiver is neither a judgment creditor nor a secured creditor, the court will be more cautious in reviewing the factors listed above as they may not readily apply. As has been pointed out in case law, the appointment of a receiver is intrusive and can have disastrous effects on the debtor. The creditor must show that there is a serious issue to be tried, that irreparable harm will occur if an appointment is not made, and that the balance of convenience must be in the creditor's favour. In effect, the court focuses on the test set out in *RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General)*.⁶⁷

63 In Ontario, the security holder seldom obtains judgment before the receiver sells the debtor's business. But see *First Pacific Credit Union v. Grimwood Sports Inc.* (1984), 59 B.C.L.R. 145, 56 C.B.R. (N.S.) 7, 16 D.L.R. (4th) 181 (B.C. C.A.) where the court commented about the creditor first obtaining judgment before it could sell.

64 *Bank of Nova Scotia v. Freure Village on Clair Creek* (1996), 40 C.B.R. (3d) 274, 1996 CarswellOnt 2328, 1996 CanLII 8258 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) where the court reviewed many of the above circumstances. In this case, the debtor had been attempting to re-finance real properties for one and a half years and was at odds with the security holder as to marketing them. In postponing the appointment for a short time to give the debtor a further opportunity to re-finance, the court concluded that a court-appointed receiver could resolve that impasse.

65 *Priority 1 Security Inc. v. Phasys Ltd.* (2006), 9 P.P.S.A.C. (3d) 203, 22 C.B.R. (5th) 258, 2006 ABQB 332 (CanLII) (Alta. Q.B.).

66 The above passage as it was written in the first edition was cited in *Citibank Can. v. Calgary Auto Centre* (1989), 75 C.B.R. (N.S.) 74, 1989 CarswellAlta 343, 1989 CanLII 3440 (Alta. Q.B.).

See *Royal Bank v. Brodak Construction Services Inc.* (2002), 34 C.B.R. (4th) 107, 2002 CarswellOnt 1774, 2002 CanLII 49590 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) referring to *Swiss Bank Corp. (Canada) v. Odyssey Industries Inc.* (1995), 30 C.B.R. (3d) 49, 1995 CarswellOnt 39 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]).

67 [1994] 1 S.C.R. 311, 111 D.L.R. (4th) 385, 1994 CanLII 117 (S.C.C.). In *Anderson v. Hunking*, 2010 ONSC 4008 (CanLII), 2010 CarswellOnt 5191 (Ont. S.C.J.), the Ontario court summarized the factors in dismissing an application for the appointment of a receiver where the creditors were neither judgment creditors nor secured creditors at paras. 15 and 16:

"[15] Section 101 of the *Courts of Justice Act* provides that the court may appoint a receiver by interlocutory order 'where it appears to a judge of the court to be just or convenient to do so.' The following principles govern motions of this kind:

(a) the appointment of a receiver to preserve assets for the purposes of execution is extraordinary relief, which prejudices the conduct of a litigant, and should be granted sparingly; *Fisher Investments Ltd. v. Nusbaum* (1988), 31 C.P.C. (2d) 158, 71 C.B.R.

7

1997 CarswellOnt 365
Ontario Court of Justice (General Division)
Uvalde Investment Co. v. 754223 Ontario Ltd.

1997 CarswellOnt 365, [1997] O.J. No. 711, 34 O.T.C. 95, 45 C.B.R. (3d) 315, 69 A.C.W.S. (3d) 374

Uvalde Investment Company, Applicant v. 754223 Ontario Limited and 754224 Ontario Limited, Respondents

Adams J.

Judgment: February 12, 1997
Docket: 97-RE-7413

Counsel: *D. M. Golden*, for applicant.
Howard Wolch, for respondents.

Subject: Insolvency; Corporate and Commercial

Related Abridgment Classifications

For all relevant Canadian Abridgment Classifications refer to highest level of case via History.

Headnote

Receivers --- Appointment — Application for appointment — General.

Receivers — Appointment — Application for appointment — Mortgagee appointing receiver — Mortgagor not allowing receiver to carry on duties — Mortgagee's request for order confirming appointment of receiver granted — It being appropriate for court to positively assist mortgagee in exercise of rights under mortgage.

The applicant was the assignee of a mortgage that was in default as of November 1996. A paragraph of the standard charge terms stated that when the security became enforceable or the moneys secured became payable, the chargee could appoint a receiver-manager to take possession and collect rents. The applicant sent the respondent mortgagor a written demand for payment, and, in response, the mortgagor challenged the validity of the mortgage. The mortgagor's application for an injunction was dismissed, and the mortgagor was allowed to take the necessary steps under the mortgage. The receiver notified tenants to pay it rent as of February 1, 1997; however, the mortgagor told tenants to disregard the notice, and to pay it the rent. The mortgagor refused to co-operate with the appointed receiver. The applicant therefore applied for an order confirming the appointment of the receiver, to deliver control and possession of the property to the receiver and allow it to exercise its rights and duties, and an order that the receiver be entitled to exercise all powers granted to it.

Held:

The application was granted.

A court may issue an order confirming the appointment of a private receiver, requiring the debtor to deliver control and possession of a property and other secured assets to the receiver, and entitling the receiver to exercise all rights and powers granted to it by the mortgage. It is implicit that the court positively assist a mortgagee in the exercise of a power of sale and related rights pertaining to rents and other entitlements, should a debtor purport to interfere. There was no suggestion of fraud or want of good faith on the part of the applicant.

Table of Authorities

Cases considered:

Arnold v. Bronstein, [1971] 1 O.R. 467, 15 D.L.R. (3d) 649 (H.C.) — *applied*

Citybank Canada v. J.D.S. Investments Ltd. (1993), Doc. B379/93 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — *referred to*

Prudential Assurance Co. (Trustee of) v. 90 Eglinton Ltd. Partnership (1994), 25 C.B.R. (3d) 139, 18 O.R. (3d) 201 (Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — *referred to*

Uvalde Investment Co. v. West End Developments Inc. (1996), Doc. B144/96 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — *referred to*

Statutes considered:

Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3

generally considered

APPLICATION for order confirming receiver appointed by mortgagee, delivering control and possession of property to receiver, and entitling receiver to exercise all powers and duties under mortgage.

Adams J. (orally):

1 This is an application for

(1) an order confirming the appointment by Uvalde Investment Company of Greenwin Property Management as a private receiver and manager of a residential apartment building municipally known as 2980 Don Mills Road, North York, Ontario,

(2) a mandatory order requiring the respondent 754223 Ontario Limited to deliver control and possession of the Don Mills property to Greenwin and to permit Greenwin to exercise its rights and duties and responsibilities as a receiver and manager of the Don Mills property; and

(3) an order that Greenwin be entitled to exercise all powers granted to it as a receiver and manager under Uvalde's security registered against the Don Mills property.

2 Uvalde is the assignee of a mortgage in the amount \$3,900,000.00 registered against the Don Mills property. 754223 Ontario Limited is the registered owner of the Don Mills property and is the mortgagor. The Don Mills mortgage is collateral security to a second mortgage registered against property municipally known as 215 Markham Road. The Don Mills mortgage incorporates Standard Charge Terms Number 879 as part of the mortgage. Paragraph 29 of the Standard Charge Terms states:

At any time after the security hereby constituted becomes enforceable, or the monies hereby secured shall have become payable, the Chargee may from time to time appoint by writing a receiver or receiver-manager (hereinafter referred to as the "Receiver") of the lands, with or without Bond, and may from time to time remove the Receiver and appoint another in his stead, and any such Receiver appointed hereunder shall have the following powers:

(a) To take possession of the charged lands and to collect the rents ...

The Don Mills mortgage specifically states that the parties are bound by the provisions of Standard Charge Terms Number 879. Mr. Sheldon Salzman is an officer and director of the respondents and an experienced solicitor. He executed the Don Mills mortgage on behalf of 754223 Ontario Limited and provided an opinion letter stating that the Don Mills mortgage constituted a valid, binding and enforceable obligation. He has specifically acknowledged receiving a copy of Standard Charge Terms Number 879. The Don Mills mortgage has been in default since November 1996.

3 On November 15, 1996 the mortgagee sent a written demand for payment to the respondents and also delivered a notice of intention to enforce its security under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*. In response, the respondents to this application commenced an action in a separate application challenging the validity of the Don Mills mortgage. In the context of both the application and the action, the respondents brought two motions seeking to enjoin the mortgagee from taking any steps whatsoever to enforce the Don Mills mortgage. The two injunction motions were argued over three days in December 1996 before Epstein J. The injunction motions were dismissed by Her Honour in written reasons released January 20, 1997. Epstein J. found as a fact that the Don Mills mortgage is in default. She framed the question to be decided on the motions as:

Should the mortgagee be prevented from taking any steps concerning the Don Mills property pending resolution of the application.

Epstein J. answered that question in the negative by refusing to grant the injunctive relief. Accordingly, the mortgagee is at liberty to enforce its security.

4 On January 24, 1997, a representative of Greenwin acting on the instructions of Uvalde attended at the Don Mills property and delivered notices to the tenants directing them to pay rents to Greenwin as agent for Uvalde. The notice would have been effective for tenant rents due on February 1, 1997. Only three tenants of the Don Mills property paid February rents to Greenwin in accordance with the tenant notices delivered on January 24, 1997. Notwithstanding the decision of Epstein J., 754223 Ontario Limited also delivered a notice to the tenants on or about January 24, 1997 instructing them to disregard the notice delivered by Uvalde and directing the tenants to continue making rental payments to Reitter Management Corporation, the current property manager.

5 On January 27, 1997, Greenwin was appointed by Uvalde to act as a private receiver and manager over the Don Mills property. Correspondence advising of the appointment of Greenwin as receiver and manager was delivered to 754223 Ontario Limited, Reitter Management Corporation and to the solicitors for 754223 Ontario Limited on January 29, 1997. No response was received to this correspondence. 754223 Ontario Limited and Reitter Management Corporation were advised that Greenwin would be attending at the Don Mills property on January 30, 1997 at 1:00 p.m. in order to arrange for an orderly transition. However, prior to attending at the property, Greenwin was advised that 754223 Ontario Limited was refusing to cooperate and would not allow Greenwin access to the Don Mills property or, in any way, allow it to take over as a receiver and manager. Since the injunction motions were argued, no attempts have been made by 754223 Ontario Limited to cure the mortgage defaults referred to in the reasons of Epstein J.

6 By its terms, the Don Mills mortgage confers upon the applicant as mortgagee the right, in the case of default, to appoint a private receiver and manager over the Don Mills property. A court may issue an order confirming the appointment of a private receiver requiring the debtor to deliver control and possession of a property and other secured assets to the receiver and entitling the receiver to exercise all of the powers granted to it by mortgage. See *Prudential Assurance Co. (Trustee of) v. 90 Eglinton Ltd. Partnership* (1994), 18 O.R. (3d) 201 (Gen. Div. [Commercial List]); *Uvalde Investment Co. v. West End Developments Inc.* (1996), unreported (Ont. Gen. Div.), Blair J., Doc. B144/96 and *Citybank Canada v. J.D.S. Investments Ltd.* (1993), unreported, Ground J., Doc. B379/93 (Ont. Gen. Div.). The respondents in this application, however, submit that the facts at hand constitute an exception to the lender taking self-help in the context of an outstanding dispute over the very remedies which the applicant seeks to enforce. In this respect, counsel for the respondents relies on Epstein J.'s reasons which determined there was a triable issue with respect to the availability of remedies under the collateral mortgage. In reply, the applicant argues that it will be deprived of the benefit of its success before Epstein J. if it is now prevented from exercising its rights under the mortgage subject to an undertaking as to damages.

7 In my view, the issue before the court is best analogized to the claim by a mortgagee to exercise the rights and power of sale. The leading case on this point is *Arnold v. Bronstein*, [1971] 1 O.R. 467 (H.C.) where at p. 468 Lacourcière J. stated:

It appears that Courts have refused to interfere with the proper exercise of a power of sale in all but the most extreme and exceptional cases. ... The general rule developed from numerous cases is that a mortgagee, acting in good faith and without fraud, will not be restrained from a proper exercise of his power of sale, except upon tender by the mortgagor of the principal moneys due, interest and costs.

I think it implicit in this observation that a court will positively assist a mortgagee in the exercise of a power of sale and related rights pertaining to rents and other entitlements should a debtor purport to interfere. In the facts at hand, there is no suggestion of fraud or want of good faith. Accordingly, I am satisfied this court should assist in the exercise of remedies akin to those of sale under the collateral mortgage. The application is granted. This court, therefore, directs and orders that:

- (a) the time for service and filing of the application record is abridged;
- (b) the appointment of Greenwin Property Management as a private receiver and manager of the Don Mills property be confirmed;
- (c) the right of Greenwin Property Management to collect rent be confirmed;
- (d) the respondent 754223 Ontario Limited forthwith deliver control and possession of the Don Mills property, including all books and records, tenant roles, plans and surveys relating to the Don Mills property, to Greenwin Property Management;
- (e) Greenwin Property Management is entitled to exercise all of the powers granted to it as a receiver and manager

pursuant to the applicant's security including the power to seize, protect and realize upon the security and

(f) the applicant is directed to set aside 28 per cent of the net rents realized and pay such rents monthly to 754223 Ontario Limited in trust for the 28 per cent ownership interest not subject to this mortgage in common ownership of the Markham property as defined in Epstein J.'s judgment of January 20, 1997.

I have endorsed the record as follows: This matter follows a three day trial before Epstein J. in December and her reasons of January 20, 1997 wherein she refused the respondents' request for an injunction to restrain the applicant from exercising its rights under a mortgage. The respondents thereafter refused to cooperate with the applicant notwithstanding Epstein J.'s decision and retained new counsel to defend against this ensuing and predictable motion. The application appeared to be very much a replay of the December proceeding and a request for an adjournment by new counsel to adduce additional evidence or to have the matter heard by Epstein J. was therefore refused. For reasons given orally and having regard to the applicant's undertaking to reimburse the respondents for all damages arising out of the authorized actions in this court should the respondents prevail at trial, the application is granted on the terms and conditions as provided. Costs fixed at \$2,000.00 payable by the respondents to the applicant and payable forthwith.

Application granted.

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2010 ONSC 3042
Ontario Superior Court of Justice

STN Labs Inc. v. Saffron Rouge Inc.

2010 CarswellOnt 3588, 2010 ONSC 3042, 189 A.C.W.S. (3d) 693, 68 C.B.R. (5th) 287

STN LABS INC. (Applicant) and SAFFRON ROUGE INC. (Respondent)

Morawetz J.

Heard: May 3, 2010
Judgment: May 26, 2010
Docket: 928/09

Counsel: A.K. Mitchell for Applicant, STN Labs Inc.

J. Larry for Respondents, Saffron Rouge Inc., Jeff Binder, Kirstin Binder

Subject: Corporate and Commercial; Insolvency; Civil Practice and Procedure

Related Abridgment Classifications

For all relevant Canadian Abridgment Classifications refer to highest level of case via History.

Headnote

Personal property security --- Remedies — Miscellaneous

Private receiver and manager — Secured creditor loaned debtor money covered by loan agreement — Debts and services agreement were secured by general security agreement — Secured creditor brought application for appointment of receiver based on non-payment of invoices under services agreement — Application was dismissed because of dispute regarding invoices — Debtor defaulted on loan agreement — Secured creditor demanded payment of all loans, except debt based on invoices — Secured creditor brought application for confirmation of private receiver and manager — Application granted — Private receiver was confirmed because criteria for court appointed receiver were met — Loans were due and owing, according to fixed obligations — Amounts demanded under promissory note were independent of indebtedness related to disputed invoices, which was subject of previous unsuccessful application — There was default that gave rise to contractual ability to appoint receiver — Although debtor's financial position had recently been improved, it was still running at loss — Debtor acknowledged its assets were for sale — Appointment of receiver allowed secured creditor to have input over sale process — Court had continuing supervision over receivership.

Debtors and creditors --- Receivers — Appointment — Application for appointment — Grounds

Secured creditor loaned debtor money covered by loan agreement — Debts and services agreement were secured by general security agreement — Secured creditor brought application for appointment of receiver based on non-payment of invoices under services agreement — Application was dismissed because of dispute regarding invoices — Debtor defaulted on loan agreement — Secured creditor demanded payment of all loans, except debt based on invoices — Secured creditor brought application for confirmation of private receiver and manager — Application granted — Private

receiver was confirmed because criteria for court appointed receiver were met — Loans were due and owing, according to fixed obligations — Amounts demanded under promissory note were independent of indebtedness related to disputed invoices, which was subject of previous unsuccessful application — There was default that gave rise to contractual ability to appoint receiver — Although debtor's financial position had recently been improved, it was still running at loss — Debtor acknowledged its assets were for sale — Appointment of receiver allowed secured creditor to have input over sale process — Court had continuing supervision over receivership.

Equity --- Equitable doctrines — Relief against penalty and forfeiture — General principles

Secured creditor loaned debtor money covered by loan agreement — Debts and services agreement were secured by general security agreement — Secured creditor brought application for appointment of receiver based on non-payment of invoices under services agreement — Application was dismissed because of dispute regarding invoices — Debtor defaulted on loan agreement — Secured creditor demanded payment of all loans, except debt based on invoices — Secured creditor brought application for confirmation of private receiver and manager — Application granted — Defence of relief from forfeiture had no application — Demand for payment was made — Cure period passed — Obligations were accelerated — Notice period was provided and expired without any payment — Remedy of appointing receiver was not penalty but rather, contractually agreed to remedy.

Table of Authorities

Cases considered by *Morawetz J.*:

Uvalde Investment Co. v. 754223 Ontario Ltd. (1997), 45 C.B.R. (3d) 315, 1997 CarswellOnt 365, 34 O.T.C. 95 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — considered

1003183 Ontario Ltd. v. Baker's Dozen Donuts Corp. (1994), 1994 CarswellOnt 3309 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — considered

Statutes considered:

Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3
Generally — referred to

s. 243 — referred to

s. 243(1) — referred to

s. 244 — referred to

Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43
s. 101 — referred to

Personal Property Security Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.10
Generally — referred to

Pt. V — referred to

s. 67 — considered

APPLICATION by secured creditor for confirmation of private receiver and manager.

Morawetz J.:

1 The Applicant, STN Labs Inc. ("STN"), brings this application for an order that the appointment by STN of Deloitte & Touche Inc. ("Deloitte") as private receiver and manager (the "Receiver"), pursuant to the terms of security granted by the Respondent, Saffron Rouge Inc. ("Saffron"), to STN, be confirmed by this court and for ancillary orders that Saffron deliver possession of the collateral which is subject to the security (the "Property") to the Receiver.

2 STN does not seek the appointment of a receiver by this court.

3 STN has a three-prong relationship with Saffron:

(a) STN loaned money to Saffron;

(b) STN owns 50% of the common shares of Saffron;

(c) STN provided website development and related support services to Saffron pursuant to a website development and related support services agreement (the "Website Development Agreement").

4 STN advanced to Saffron a \$100,000 loan (the "Initial \$100,000 Advance") on September 30, 2008, to provide Saffron with working capital.

5 On March 26, 2009, Saffron and STN entered into a loan facility agreement (the "Loan Facility Agreement") and Saffron confirmed the Initial \$100,000 Advance plus accrued interest.

6 In addition, Saffron executed a grid promissory note (the "Grid Promissory Note") which was attached as a schedule to the Loan Facility Agreement. The Grid Promissory Note has been completed to include the Initial \$100,000 Advance plus interest totalling \$4,800.

7 At this time, an amended general security agreement ("GSA") was given as security for the Initial \$100,000 Advance granting STN a first-ranking interest in Saffron's present and future property. The Initial \$100,000 Advance was repayable commencing on January 31, 2010.

8 On March 26, 2009, Saffron and STN entered into the Website Development Agreement, pursuant to which Saffron engaged STN to perform ongoing services relating to the design and construction of Saffron's website, online marketing, the hosting and maintenance of Saffron's website, managing a public relations campaign for Saffron and managing Saffron's

direct mail efforts.

9 Prior to entering into the Website Development Agreement and the Loan Facility Agreement, between October 2008 and March 2009, STN provided services to Saffron for which Saffron owed STN \$117,495 (\$111,900 plus GST) (the "Pre-March 2009 Debt").

10 Paragraph 7.1 of the Website Development Agreement provides as follows:

7.1 Immediately upon execution of the agreement [Saffron] shall pay STN the sum of \$111,900, which amount shall represent payment to STN for the services performed by it and received by [Saffron] and all expenses referred to in relation to section 3.1 above during the period from October 1, 2008 to the effective date.

11 Saffron was unable to pay the Pre-March 2009 Debt to STN on March 26, 2009 as required by the terms of the Website Development Agreement. STN agreed to finance Saffron's obligation to pay this amount on closing and added the Pre-March 2009 Debt to amounts payable under the Loan Facility Agreement.

12 The Grid Promissory Note has been completed to include the Pre-March 2009 Debt.

13 In March 2009, two additional loans were advanced by STN to Saffron in the amounts of U.S. \$100,000 and CDN \$450,000 (the "Additional Loans") as evidenced by separate promissory notes (collectively, the "Promissory Notes").

14 Saffron's obligation under the Grid Promissory Note, the Promissory Notes and the Website Development Agreement are secured by the GSA. The security interest of STN was perfected in accordance with the provisions of the PPSA. Security was also provided overall intellectual property of Saffron.

15 Pursuant to the Loan Facility Agreement, STN agreed to extend additional revolving credit to assist Saffron in financing the services to be provided by STN to Saffron under the Website Development Agreement.

16 STN alleges that it has performed services pursuant to the Website Development Agreement following March 26, 2009 and has rendered invoices to Saffron for those services (the "Post-March 2009 Debt").

17 The invoices comprising the Post-March 2009 Debt are disputed by Saffron. No portion of the Post-March 2009 Debt has been added to the Grid Promissory Note.

18 On November 20, 2009, STN made an application for the appointment of a receiver pursuant to s. 243(1) of the BIA

and s. 101 of the CJA (the “Receivership Application”). The Receivership Application was based on the non-payment by Saffron of the invoices rendered by STN for services allegedly performed by STN under the Website Development Agreement and comprising the Post-March 2009 Debt.

19 On December 22, 2009, Hourigan J. dismissed the Receivership Application concluding that there was a *bona fide* dispute regarding the invoices rendered by STN under the Website Development Agreement. As such, it had not been established that there was an event of default which gave rise to the right to appoint a receiver.

20 The endorsement of Hourigan J. contemplated that circumstances could change:

Things may well change quite quickly in January 2010 when payments become due under the agreements between the parties. However, it is inappropriate to order the appointment of a receiver on the basis of a potential future default.

21 Under the terms of the Grid Promissory Note, the amounts payable thereunder were to be repaid in accordance with the terms of the Loan Facility Agreement, which requires a minimum payment of 8% of the outstanding amount of the loans evidenced by the Grid Promissory Note to be paid commencing January 31, 2010 and thereafter on the last business day of each month.

22 Saffron failed to make payment on January 31, 2010. On February 1, 2010, Saffron was provided with written notice to cure its default as required by the terms of the Loan Facility Agreement.

23 Pursuant to the terms of the Loan Facility Agreement, an event of default occurs in the event that Saffron fails to make any payment that is due and such failure to pay continues for a period of five days following written notice of default being delivered to Saffron. Upon the occurrence of an event of default, STN is entitled to accelerate payment of the loans under the Loan Facility Agreement.

24 Saffron did not cure its payment default and, consequently, on February 9, 2010, STN declared an event of default to have occurred pursuant to the Loan Facility Agreement and accelerated and demanded payment of the Initial \$100,000 Advance and the Pre-March 2009 Debt and issued a s. 244 BIA notice.

25 STN did not demand payment of the Post-March 2009 Debt.

26 Saffron failed to satisfy the demand for payment and after the expiration of the ten-day notice period, on February 20, 2010, STN appointed Deloitte as Receiver.

27 Saffron refused to permit Deloitte to take possession of the collateral.

28 Saffron takes the position that STN's application should be dismissed for several reasons.

29 First, the application is nothing more than an attempt to re-litigate an issue already determined by Hourigan J. - namely, whether there is a dispute about the amounts under the parties' Website Development Services Agreement.

30 Second, the appointment of a privately appointed receiver should not be confirmed where there are material facts in dispute. Saffron takes issue with all of the amounts owing under the Website Development Services Agreement, including the amounts that form the basis for the \$18,427.58 missed payment. Saffron asserts that the existence of a claim for damages from an alleged breach of the Loan Facility Agreement, and the negligence of STN, results in a set-off against any amounts that Saffron may otherwise owe to STN (the "Set-Off Defence").

31 Saffron takes the position that on EBITDA basis, losses for February 2010 were reduced to \$7,694 whereas the previous 12 months (February 1, 2009 to January 31, 2010) showed average monthly losses of \$30,410.

32 Further, Saffron takes the position that commencing in the middle of February 2010, the Binders began accruing \$100,000 of their combined annual salary of \$240,000 to assist with Saffron's cash flow and that this decision will further improve monthly profits which are anticipated to near break-even for 2010.

33 Saffron also acknowledges that Mr. Binder has been actively engaged in trying to sell Saffron as a going concern in the past number of months.

34 Third, the balance favours Saffron in the circumstances as Saffron would be seriously prejudiced if a privately appointed receiver is permitted to take over its business. Saffron takes the position that it is able to turn its business around and that business has improved in the past two months.

35 Finally, and alternatively, Saffron takes the position that, if it is found that the \$18,427.58 payment is for an amount that is not in dispute, Saffron should be granted relief against forfeiture in the circumstances.

36 From the standpoint of the Respondents, the issues on this application are:

- (a) Should the court confirm STN's appointment of a private receiver and manager in the face of the endorsement of Hourigan J.?
- (b) Should the court confirm the appointment in the face of the parties dispute regarding the amounts owing?
- (c) Does the balance favour STN or the Respondents?
- (d) In the alternative, should the court grant relief against Saffron's forfeiture?

37 STN submits that Saffron's position cannot be accepted as:

(a) No particulars of the damages arising from STN's alleged breach of the Loan Facility Agreement and alleged negligence, which Saffron claims is entitled to set-off against the Initial \$100,000 Advance and the Pre-March 2009 Debt have been provided.

(b) The Grid Promissory Note provides that amounts owing under the Promissory Note shall not be subject to any rights of set-off.

(c) The dispute resolution provisions of the Website Development Agreement have no application to the payment default under the Grid Promissory Note. The amounts for which payment have been demanded pursuant to the terms of the Grid Promissory Note and the Loan Facility Agreement are independent of amounts payable to Saffron for outstanding invoices pursuant to the Website Development Agreement and comprising the Post-March 2009 Debt. The Loan Facility Agreement and Grid Promissory Note do not contain a dispute resolution provision.

(d) Mr. Binder, in his November affidavit, did not dispute Saffron's obligation to repay the Initial \$100,000 Advance.

(e) On this application, STN seeks only the court's assistance in facilitating Deloitte as privately appointed Receiver to carry out its mandate including taking possession of STN's collateral. The evidence filed in support of this application is not the same evidence which was filed in support of the Receivership Application. STN has demanded payment of only those amounts due and payable to STN with respect to monies advanced by Saffron by way of loan. No demand was made for payment of invoices delivered for services rendered by STN pursuant to the website agreement subsequent to March 26, 2009.

(f) At the time the Receivership Application was heard, default of amounts evidenced by the Grid Promissory Note payable in accordance with the terms of the Loan Facility Agreement had not occurred. An event of default has since occurred on February 5, 2010 and continues.

(g) Relief from forfeiture does not apply. The Binders caused Saffron to default in making the payment due to STN under the Loan Facility Agreement and the Grid Promissory Note and refused to permit Deloitte to take possession of the collateral yet all the while continued to cause Saffron to pay their monthly salary. STN is the only secured creditor of Saffron. STN is, in effect, the "banker" to Saffron. Saffron has no equity and is insolvent.

38 STN also submits that issues being raised by Saffron with respect to the current financial position of Saffron are irrelevant to the issues on this application and that the disputes which Saffron has regarding services provided by STN are the subject matter of an arbitration proceeding between the parties.

39 Simply put, STN takes the position that a portion of STN's loans totalling \$225,544.82 (the "Indebtedness") was due and payable, a demand for payment has been made and the time period to satisfy the demand has expired, as has the ten-day period under the BIA notice. As such, STN's security is enforceable. A Receiver has been appointed and STN requests the assistance of the court in its enforcement of its security rights.

Analysis

40 Section 67 of the PPSA provides that the court may give directions regarding the exercise of the secured party's rights and the discharge of the debtor's obligations under Part V of the PPSA. The court may also make any order with respect to the receiver and manager, however appointed, "that it thinks fit in the exercise of its general jurisdiction over a receiver or

receiver and manager”.

41 Counsel to STN submits that a secured party need only establish that there is a debt owing, that the debt is secured and the security is enforceable and, in such circumstances, a court should not interfere in the proper exercise of a secured party's contractual rights to appoint a receiver and to take possession of the collateral subject to its security: see *1003183 Ontario Ltd. v. Baker's Dozen Donuts Corp.*, 1994 CarswellOnt 3309 (Ont. Gen. Div.).

42 Further, counsel submits that absent fraud or want of good faith, the courts will positively assist a secured creditor in the enforcement of its security interest in circumstances where a debtor purports to interfere with such rights: see *Uvalde Investment Co. v. 754223 Ontario Ltd.*, [1997] O.J. No. 711 (Ont. Gen. Div.).

43 Saffron and STN entered into the Loan Facility Agreement and Saffron signed the Grid Promissory Note. Counsel to STN submits that the obligations of Saffron are secured by the GSA and the security interest of STN has been perfected in accordance with the PPSA. An event of default has occurred and is continuing. Saffron has failed to satisfy the demand for payment of the Initial \$100,000 Advance and the Pre-March 2009 Debt and the ten-day BIA notice period has expired. Payment of amounts due under the Grid Promissory Note have now been accelerated and STN is entitled to the remedies provided for in the Loan Facility Agreement and the GSA.

44 In essence, counsel to the STN submits that all required elements have been satisfied by STN and that the appointment of Deloitte should be confirmed.

45 In my view, in the circumstances of this case, the inquiry has to be broader. Specifically, it is necessary to take into account that STN applied to court, unsuccessfully, for the appointment of a receiver.

46 In my view, it is necessary to consider this motion in the context of whether circumstances are such that it would be appropriate to appoint a receiver, based on the criteria associated with applications under either s. 243 of the BIA or s. 101 of the CJA.

47 In the circumstances of this case, it is my view that, had STN requested the appointment of a receiver, a receivership order would be granted. In the context of this application, it is therefore appropriate, to confirm the appointment of Deloitte as Receiver.

48 I have reached this conclusion for the following reasons:

(a) The Initial \$100,000 Advance and the Pre-March 2009 Debt are due and owing. These obligations were fixed at the time of the finalization of the Website Development Agreement. Saffron acknowledged these debts in the documents executed on March 26, 2009.

(b) The amounts outstanding under the Grid Promissory Note are not subject to any rights of set-off, abatement or

reduction. Even in instances where equitable set-off is claimed, equitable set-off requires that the opposing claims flow from the same transaction or relationship between the parties. That is not the case in this situation. The claims in respect of this application flow from the lending arrangement. The claims of Saffron flow from services provided under the Website Development Agreement. The claims of Saffron from set-off do not flow from the same transaction and relationship. Under the lending agreement, the relationship is that STN is lender and Saffron is borrower and the obligations are evidenced by the Grid Promissory Note. Under the services agreement, STN is service provider and Saffron is customer. Issues between them are subject to the dispute resolution process under the Website Development Agreement. In my view, equitable set-off is not applicable.

(c) Justice Hourigan was of the view that Post-March 2009 Debt was disputed. The Post-March 2009 Debt is to be resolved pursuant to the dispute resolution provisions of the Website Development Agreement. The Post-March 2009 Debt has no application to the payment default under the Grid Promissory Note.

49 The amounts demanded under the Grid Promissory Note and the Loan Facility Agreement are independent of any indebtedness owed under the Website Development Agreement. The Loan Facility Agreement and Grid Promissory Note do not contain a dispute resolution provision.

50 Counsel to Saffron also raised the defence of abuse of process. In my view, the enforceability of the GSA, based on an event of default arising out of non-payment of the obligations evidenced by the Grid Promissory Note, was not considered or adjudicated by Hourigan J. In my view, abuse of process issues are not engaged. In addition, it seems clear that Hourigan J. contemplated the possibility of changing circumstances and, in particular, payment default as of January 31, 2010. This, in fact, came to pass. The application is founded on such a payment default.

51 Relief from forfeiture was also raised. I have been satisfied that this defence has no application in the current circumstances. Firstly, demand for payment was made. The relevant documents provided for a cure period. The cure period passed. The obligations were accelerated. The ten-day Notice was provided. The ten-day period expired without any payment. The remedy of appointing a receiver is not a penalty but rather a contractually agreed to remedy. The conduct of STN, in the circumstances, is reasonable.

52 Furthermore, the issues raised by Saffron relating to its recently improved financial position have not persuaded me that the balance of convenience favours the Respondents. Taking into account the improved performance, EBITDA remains negative. The addition of interest can only make Saffron's financial position worse.

53 In this case, the Applicant has established that there has been default that gives rise to a contractual ability to appoint a receiver. Further, the financial condition of the Respondents and the Respondents' acknowledgement that its assets are for sale, leads me to the conclusion that it is appropriate that the Applicant has input over the process in order to preserve and protect its position. Saffron is not precluded from pursuing a potential sale of assets and furthermore, the appointment of the Receiver need not preclude Saffron from continuing with the dispute resolution under the Website Development Agreement.

54 The appointment of Deloitte is confirmed.

55 However, I am of the view that it is appropriate for the court to have continuing supervision over the receivership. The

Receiver is to report back to court within 30 days at which time it can provide its recommendations for a future course of action. The Receiver is also directed to engage independent counsel in respect of this matter. Saffron and the Binders are at liberty to continue with the dispute resolution under the Website Development Agreement.

56 An order shall issue to give effect to the foregoing.

Application granted.

End of Document

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COMPUTERSHARE TRUST COMPANY OF CANADA
Applicant

-and-

MADY STEELES 2011 LTD.
Respondent

Court File No. CV-15-10897-00CL

ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
(COMMERCIAL LIST)

Proceeding commenced at Toronto

BOOK OF AUTHORITIES OF THE
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(Returnable March 5, 2015)

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